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THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN STARTUP FIRMS
Brian J. Broughman*
Abstract
This Article develops a new theory to explain the widespread use of
independent directors in the governance of startupfirms. Privately held
startups often assign a tie-breaking board seat to a third-party
independent director. This practice cannot be explained by the existing
corporategovernance literature, which relies on diffuse ownership and
passive investment-features unique to the publicly traded firm. To
develop an alternative theory, I model a financing contract between an
entrepreneurand a venture capital investor. I show that allocatinga tiebreaking vote to an unbiased thirdparty can prevent opportunistic
behavior that would occur ifthe firm were controlledby its ehtrepreneur
or VC investor. Rather than monitoring management, independent
directors in a startup firm "arbitrate"disputes between entrepreneurs
and investors. Consistent with my theory, empirical data from Silicon
Valley startups illustrateseveral mechanisms entrepreneursand VCs use
to select an unbiased independent director.My analysis has implications
for corporate law, as it suggests that heightenedfiduciary protections
could undermine the role of the independent director in startupfirms.
I. INTRODUCTION

Independent corporate directors have attracted considerable attention from
academics and policymakers in light of recent corporate scandals. Following the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), publicly traded firms are required to
have an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors,' and both the
NYSE and NASDAQ now require independent directors to comprise a majority of
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' See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3) (2006).
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the board of each listed company.2 In a publicly traded firm, independent directors
are expected to monitor management on behalf of dispersed equity holders.
Though the effect on financial performance is uncertain, policy makers
consistently view independent directors as an integral part of healthy board
oversight.4
This interest in independent directors focuses exclusively on the governance
of publicly traded firms. Academic writers have almost completely overlooked the
role of independent directors in privately held firms. Yet, privately held startup
firms frequently include independent directors on their boards, often in key tiebreaking positions.s Firms financed by venture capital (VC)6 allocate one-quarter
of their board seats to independent directors. More than half of the time, the
entrepreneur and VC investors (the VCs) share control of the board with an
independent director holding the tie-breaking vote.7
The use of independent directors in privately held startup firms cannot be
explained by the existing literature. Under the dominant theory, independent
directors are expected to monitor management on behalf of dispersed common
stockholders. This theory only applies to publicly held firms where there is a clear
See NYSE

§ 303A(1) (2002); NASDAQ MANUAL, R.
5606(b)(1) (2009). These reforms are consistent with earlier reform proposals, which
generally called for a higher percentage of independent directors on corporate boards; see,
eg., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 170-85 (1976)
(suggesting that greater independent director representation on corporate boards would
improve monitoring of management).
3 See infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the
Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 101, 102-04 (1985) (finding that board composition has only a mild effect on firm
2

LISTED COMPANY MANUAL

performance); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The UncertainRelationshipBetween Board
Composition and Firm Performance,54 BUS. LAW. 921, 922 (1999) (finding that increased

independent director representation does not correlate with improved firm performance);
Roberta Romano, CorporateLaw and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
277, 279-97 (1996) (discussing theoretical justifications for the use of independent
directors and reviewing empirical studies of board composition).
s See Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale
of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 388-90 (2010); Steven N. Kaplan & Per
Str6mberg, FinancialContractingTheory Meets the Real World: An EmpiricalAnalysis Of
Venture CapitalContracts,70 REv. ECON. STUD. 281, 287-89 (2003).

In this Article, VC refers to both "venture capital" and "venture capital investors."
Kaplan & Str6mberg, supranote 5, at 287-88.
8 For a description of alternative theories of the independent director, see infra notes
125-139 and accompanying text. The dominant explanation for the use of independent
directors-the monitoring role-is based on diffuse ownership and passive investment.
Other explanations, however, also cannot explain the use of independent directors in VCbacked firms. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999) (proposing a theory of board
mediation based on governance arrangements in publicly held firms). Even the definition
6

7See
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separation between ownership and control.9 In a privately held startup, by contrast,
ownership is concentrated and investors have sufficient control rights to monitor
management directly.' 0 VCs do not need an independent director to monitor
management, since the VCs perform this task themselves. Independent directors
serve a different role in privately held startup firms.
This Article develops an alternative theory based on the financing contract
between a firm's entrepreneurs and VCs. The structure of a startup's board,
including the use of independent directors, is endogenous to the financing
contract." Thus, the relevant question is: why would a firm's entrepreneurs and
VCs want to share control. of their board with an outside party holding the tiebreaking seat?
To answer this question, I consider the parties' divergent financial interests.
Entrepreneurs typically hold common stock, while VCs hold preferred stock.
Preferred stock includes a liquidation preference entitling its holder to priority over
common stock in a liquidation or sale of the firm. As a result, VCs may favor a
quick exit and wish to avoid risky strategies that could benefit common
stockholders. This conflict affects a variety of important decisions faced by startup
firms-whether to hire a new CEO, when to sell the firm, how much to invest in a
new technology, and so forth.
Unfortunately, the financing contract is necessarily incomplete and cannot
fully align the parties' interests across such decisions.12 As a result, the allocation
of board seats becomes particularly important. If either party controls the board, it
can use this position opportunistically, causing the firm to pursue actions that
benefit it at the expense of the welfare of the firm as a whole. The financial
contracting literature only considers two possibilities: (1) VC control, and (2)
entrepreneur control.' 3 Both arrangements are subject to opportunistic behavior by
the controlling party.14
of an independent director is different in the startup firm context, as compared to the
publicly traded firms, emphasizing that the same theory does not apply in both settings.
9 See infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
'0See infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
" For an illustration of this approach, see generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985)

(developing a theory showing that

corporate governance arrangements are designed to reduce ex post opportunism). With
respect to board composition particularly, see Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directorsand Their Monitoring of the CEO,
88 AM. EcON. REV. 96 (1998).
12 Contractual incompleteness

may be due to bounded rationality, transaction costs, or

non-verifiable information. See generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An
Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. EcoN. STUD. 473

(1992) (modeling the allocation of control as an incomplete contract between an
entrepreneur and an investor).
" See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
14 The risk that entrepreneurs face when the VCs control the board is discussed in
Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 967 (2006). Conversely, the risk that VCs face when the entrepreneurs
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Adding an independent director to the board allows a new alternative: control
of the board can be shared with an independent director acting as the tie-breaking
vote. To illustrate, consider a board with three directors: an entrepreneur, a VC,
and an independent director. I refer to this arrangement as "ID-arbitration" to
emphasize the independent director's position as a quasi-arbitrator. The
independent director can settle disputes that may arise between the entrepreneur
and VC. ID-arbitration avoids deadlock without leaving the entrepreneur or the VC
vulnerable to unilateral actions by a controlling party.
More importantly, the presence of an independent director may prevent
conflicts from ever materializing. Under ID-arbitration, neither the entrepreneur
nor the VC can take any action opposed by the other party without obtaining the
support of the independent director. The parties must propose actions that they
expect will be endorsed by the independent director. Similar to analysis of final
offer arbitration, the entrepreneur and VC will converge towards the action
preferred by the independent director.15 The independent director does not need to
"arbitrate" actual conflicts, but rather, primarily serves as . a commitment
mechanism that forces the entrepreneur and VC to compromise. Provided the
independent director is relatively unbiased, competition for the independent
director's support limits the threat of opportunism.
This form of board-level arbitration replaces controlling party opportunism
with independent director discretion. The desirability of this arrangement depends
on how independent directors use their discretion. If an independent director
always sides with the same party or otherwise colludes with one of the primary
parties, this arrangement is no different than giving the entrepreneur or VC control.
However, if the independent director is relatively unbiased, then ID-arbitration can
improve corporate governance.' 6
It is an empirical question whether any factors constrain the independent
director's discretion. Using evidence from a sample of fifty-four VC-backed firms,
I provide data on the allocation of board control, describe how the parties select
control the board is discussed in William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside:
PreferredStock and CorporateControl, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891 (2002).
1s Convergence towards the arbitrator's "fair" outcome is an established result in the
literature on final offer arbitration. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The
intuition behind my analysis is similar to the convergence of political platforms as
predicted by the median voter theorem. See generally Anthony Downs, An Economic
Theory of PoliticalAction in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135 (1957). In essence, the
entrepreneur and VC createa median voter by adding an independent director to the board.
16 ID-arbitration can improve the operation of local business norms. The entrepreneur
and VC may want their relationship to be governed by business norms; however, such
norms are hard to define and specify in the contract. Furthermore, a firm's internal conduct
may be difficult for outside parties to observe, and consequently, business norms may be
violated with little penalty from the local community. Allocating a tie-breaking board seat
to an independent director with industry experience, however, lets the parties commit to
such norms as interpreted by the independent director. For a discussion of Silicon Valley
norms, see infra note 99.
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independent directors, and discuss the qualifications of the independent directors in
this sample. The data illustrate numerous safeguards that entrepreneurs and
investors use to ensure an impartial and qualified director.
I conclude by discussing implications for fiduciary duties in VC-backed firms.
Fiduciary obligations could potentially limit opportunistic conduct in VC-backed
firms; however, for reasons discussed in this Article, fiduciary obligations, as
interpreted by Delaware courts, place a weak constraint on opportunistic behavior
by either party. My analysis of the independent director suggests a reason for this
hands-off approach. The types of disputes that a court would need to adjudicate in
startup firms are typically business decisions: whether to sell the firm, which
investment to pursue, etc. Determining the efficient outcome of such disputes
requires experience with startup firms and familiarity with the relevant industryqualities that a judge generally does not have. However, unlike judges,
independent directors often have significant industry experience and are arguably
more qualified to "adjudicate" such disputes.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II explains the cash
flow and control rights in a typical VC financing contract, and describes data from
past studies on the allocation of board seats in VC-backed firms. Part III describes
the problem of opportunistic conduct that can occur if a firm's board is controlled
by its entrepreneurs or VCs. Part IV explains how an unbiased independent
director as tiebreaker can prevent opportunism. Part V supports my theory with
data from a sample of VC-backed firms located in Silicon Valley. Part VI
considers existing academic theories of the independent director and discusses why
these cannot account for the use of independent directors in VC-backed firms. Part
VII then discusses implications of my theory for corporate law and fiduciary
obligations.
II. BACKGROUND ON VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING

This Part considers the allocation of cash flow rights and control rights in VC
financing contracts. VC-backed startups almost always issue two classes of stock:
common (held by the entrepreneurs and employees) and convertible preferred
(held by the VCs). While researchers have identified incentives and tax
explanations for the use of convertible preferred stock, it also creates a significant
conflict of interest between a startup's entrepreneurs and V.Cs. The existence of
such conflicts makes the allocation of board seats between entrepreneurs and VCs
particularly important. Empirical studies show that control of the board is typically
shared with a third-party independent director holding the tie-breaking seat.
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A. Cash Flow Rights

VC-backed startups typically issue two classes of stock: (1) common (held by
entrepreneurs and employees) and (2) convertible preferred (held by VCs).17
Convertible preferred stock has two key features. First, it includes a liquidation
preference. When the firm is sold or dissolved, preferred stockholders are entitled
to be paid the full amount of their liquidation preference before common
shareholders receive anything. The liquidation preference usually equals the
amount invested ("lX preferences") but can be a multiple of that amount and may
include unpaid dividends.' 8 Second, a preferred stockholder can choose to convert
her shares into common stock at a pre-specified ratio. Upon conversion, liquidation
preferences and any other rights associated with the preferred stock are eliminated.
A VC holding preferred stock will generally choose to convert into common stock
only if the company is sold or liquidated for a sufficiently high price.' 9
Researchers have offered several explanations for convertible preferred
stock. 20 First, preferred stock can address an information asymmetry at the time of
investment. 2 1 Before investment, the entrepreneur may have better information
than the VC regarding the value and feasibility of the project.2 2 VCs may be
concerned that the entrepreneur plans to sell them equity at an inflated price. 2 3 If
See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 510 (1990); Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 5, at
286. Angel investors (which provide financing to similar types of start-ups as VCs, but at
an earlier point in the start-up's growth) typically receive common stock. See Darian M.
Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior ofAngel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1405, 1406,
1422 (2008).
18 VCs' convertible preferred stock sometimes includes participation rights (often
referred to as "participating preferred"). Participating preferred entitles the holder not only
to a liquidation preference, but also to share with common shareholders, on a pro rata basis,
in any additional value available for distribution to shareholders, usually up to a specified
amount (say, three times the original investment). Thus, the VCs will convert their
participating preferred shares into common stock only if the amount they would receive as
common stockholders exceeds the sum of their liquidation preference plus the value of
"

their participation rights. My analysis assumes, for ease of exposition, that the VCs hold
nonparticipating preferred stock; however, this assumption does not affect my analysis,
since the basic conflict between preferred and common stock exists regardless of
participation rights.
19 If the firm is sold in an IPO (initial public offering) meeting certain conditions, the
financing agreement may require the VCs to convert to common (mandatory conversion)
even if the preferred stock would offer a higher payout. See Thomas Hellmann, IPOs,
Acquisitions, and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital, 81 J. FIN. ECoN.

649, 650 (2006). In most settings, however, conversion is not required.
See Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 983.
id
22 id
23 id
20
21
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the VCs are issued preferred stock, however, the entrepreneur cannot profit from
her private information, since the liquidation preference protects the VC's claim.24
The use of preferred stock allows the entrepreneur to credibly signal that the firm
has a high value.2 5 Second, preferred stock shifts additional risk to entrepreneurs
and can provide stronger incentive effects for the entrepreneur than if the firm
were financed entirely with common stock. 26 Finally, the dual-class structure has a
tax benefit, since it allows the firm to price separately (1) the common stock issued
to entrepreneurs and employees, and (2) the preferred stock issued to VCs. As
explained by Gilson and Schizer, the use of preferred stock effectively allows the
startup to shift some employee income from high ordinary tax rates to low capital
gains tax rates.27
However, despite its many advantages, preferred stock also creates a conflict.
Because common shareholders and preferred shareholders have different cash flow
rights, their interests in how the startup is run can diverge.28 In certain states of the
world, VCs' liquidation preferences give them debt-like cash flow rights, while
making common shareholders analogous to option holders. Preferred-holding VCs
may favor less-risky strategies than common shareholders. This conflict is relevant
to a variety of important decisions frequently faced by VC-backed firms-whether
to hire a new CEO, when to sell the firm, how much to invest in a new technology,
and so forth. Neither party will always favor the strategy that maximizes total
shareholder value.
24id
25 See

id.; Sahlman, supra note 17, at 510 ("A security that is senior in rights to
common stock in effect lowers the economic value of the common. Members of the
management team can therefore buy the common stock at low prices without incurring
taxable income."); see also Jeremy C. Stein, Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Equity
Financing, 32 J. FIN. EcoN. 3, 3-4 (1992) (arguing that corporations use convertible debt

to avoid adverse selection costs associated with equity financing).

See Sahlman, supra note 17, at 510-11.
See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure:A Tax Explanationfor Convertible PreferredStock, 116 HARV. L. REv. 874, 876
(2003).
28 Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 993-96. My analysis in this
paper focuses on the
26
27

conflict between preferred stock and common stock caused by the different cash flow
rights assigned to each group. This conflict, however, is endogenous to the financing
contract, and thus could be removed by giving both parties common stock. However, for
the reasons discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 20-27, the parties are
likely to demand preferred stock regardless of the conflict it creates. This is not necessarily
true outside the United States. See Douglas J. Cumming, Capital Structure in Venture

Finance, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 550, 581-82 (2005) (reporting that VCs receive a variety of
different types. of securities, including common stock, in Canadian VC financing
transactions). Nonetheless, I restrict my analysis in this paper to VC investments for
preferred stock. For an alternative analysis based on a conflict between private benefits and

cash flow rights, see generally Aghion & Bolton, supra note 12; Brian J. Broughman,
Independent Directorsand Board Control in Venture Finance(Jan. 23, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract- 1123840.
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B. ControlRights

The existence of such conflicts makes the allocation of control rights
particularly important. The VC financing arrangement addresses the allocation of
control in two primary ways. First, the parties often negotiate for protective
provisions, which give the protected party-usually the VC-the right to veto
certain transactions, such as the sale of company assets or any amendment to the
corporate charter.29 Second, the parties negotiate board control. Protective
provisions only create a right to block unfavorable transactions. Board control
gives the controlling party the critical ability to initiate fundamental transactions.30
Giving either party unilateral control of the board, however, potentially exposes
the non-controlling party to opportunistic behavior.3 1
Board seats in VC-backed firms are typically allocated on a class-specific
basis as specified in the financing documents.32 This makes it possible to classify
each director into one of three categories: (1) VC, (2) entrepreneur, or (3)
independent director.33 In a study documenting over 200 rounds of VC financing,
Kaplan and Stramberg find that VCs hold approximately 41% of the total board
seats, entrepreneurs hold 35%, and independent directors hold the remaining
23%.34 Despite the fact that VCs hold more board seats than the other parties, they
generally do not control the board. Rather, board control is typically shared. VCs
29
Fried & Ganor, supranote 14, at 987.
30

Id. The venture capital literature offers various explanations for VCs' control rights,
especially board control. See generally Broughman & Fried, supra note 5 (explaining that
board control allows VCs to sell the firm without needing to carve out additional payments
to common stockholders); Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 994 (arguing the VC board
control makes it easier for VCs to exit their investment over the possible objections of
other parties); Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of

Venture Capital, 50 J.FIN. 1461 (1995) (noting that staged financing facilitates monitoring
the CEO); Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital

Contracts, 29 RAND J. EcoN. 57 (1998) (arguing that VC control of the board can reduce
entrepreneur agency costs by allowing VCs to monitor the entrepreneur and fire her if
necessary); Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalistsand the Oversight ofPrivateFirms, 50 J. FIN.
301, 302-03 (1995) (same); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital,53
UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005) (same as Fried & Ganor, supra).
31 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1081 (2003).
32 The allocation of board seats is typically specified in the corporate charter and in
voting agreements negotiated in connection with each round of financing. Class-specific
board seats emphasize that the use of independent directors is not simply an accident of
shareholder voting, but rather is explicitly contracted over by the parties.
33 Angel investors generally do not receive board seats. However, if an angel is
awarded a board seat, I classify the seat based on the type of equity held by the angel: (1)
"VC" if the angel holds preferred stock and (2) "entrepreneur" if the angel holds common
stock.
34 See Kaplan & Str6mberg, supranote 5, at 288.
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control the board 25% of the time and entrepreneurs control the board 14% of the
time. 5 In the remaining firms (61%), VCs and entrepreneurs share control of the
board with third-party independent directors holding the tie-breaking vote(s). 3 6
Figure 1: Allocation of Board Seats and Board Control
Data Source: Kaplan and Str6mberg (2003)

Board Seats

Board Control
VC Seats (VC-Control)
Entrepreneur Seats (E-Control)
ID Seats (ID-Arbitration)

The financial contracting literature models the allocation of control between
an entrepreneur and an investor, but overlooks the use of independent directors. In
a foundational paper, Aghion and Bolton show that control should be awarded to
the entrepreneur, whenever possible, to protect the entrepreneur's private benefits;
however, investor control may often be necessary to ensure the investor's
participation.3 7 Aghion and Bolton's study is complimented by a number of recent
articles that focus specifically on the allocation of control rights in VC-backed
firms. 38 These studies treat control as an indivisible right that can be held at any
35

d.

36id
37

See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 12.

See generally Erik Bergl6f, A Control Theory of Venture CapitalFinance, 10 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 247 (1994); Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capitaland the
Structure of CapitalMarkets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998);
Woiuter Dessein, Information and Control in Alliances & Ventures, 60 J. FIN. 2513 (2005);
3

Hellmann, supra note 19; Hellmann, supra note 30; Andrei A. Kirilenko, Valuation and
Control in Venture Finance, 56 J. FIN. 565 (2001); Leslie M. Marx, Efficient Venture
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given time by only one party-either the entrepreneur or the VC. The financial
contracting literature largely ignores the independent director, and consequently
fails to explain ID-arbitration, the most commonly observed startup board
configuration.
Some legal academics have noted the frequent use of independent directors in
VC-backed startups. 3 9 However, these articles often assume independent directors
are either controlled by the VCs or controlled by the entrepreneurs. Smith, for
example, examines corporate charters from a sample of VC-backed firms. 4 0 He
concludes that independent director board seats will either be controlled by the
entrepreneurs or the VCs, depending on who holds more equity at the time. 4 1 Fried
and Ganor argue that "so-called 'independent directors' are often not truly
independent of the VCs,'42 suggesting that VCs may functionally control the board
even when an independent director holds the tie-breaking vote. In both of these
articles the independent director is generally treated not as a true third party, but
rather as an entrepreneur or as an investor.
In contrast, Bratton, as well as Kaplan and Stramberg, treat the independent
director as a distinct third party, who may sometimes vote with the entrepreneurs
and sometimes vote with the VCs. 4 3 Bratton notes that independent directors may
be used because the entrepreneur and VC investor cannot explicitly contract over
the relevant contingencies: the parties may "prefer to grapple with unverifiable
facts ... in the black box of the boardroom" and may intentionally appoint a thirdparty independent director to act as a tiebreaker.44 These articles, however, do not
consider how a tie-breaking independent director changes the incentives of the
entrepreneur and VC.

CapitalFinancingCombining Debt and Equity, 3 REV. ECON. DESIGN 371 (1998); Klaus
M. Schmidt, Convertible Securities and Venture CapitalFinance,58 J. FIN. 1139 (2003);
Vijay Yerramilli, Joint Control and Redemption Rights in Venture Capital Contracts

(ECGI

Working

Paper

Series

in

Finance,

2004),

available

at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=481362.
3 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 14, at 899-901; Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at
987-88; Smith, supra note 30, at 330-37.
40 See Smith, supra note 30, at 324-27.
41 See id. at 332-337. Smith's data is based primarily on corporate charters rather than

voting rights agreements. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
42 Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 988.
43 See Bratton, supra note 14, at 899-901; Kaplan & Str6mberg, supranote 5, at 300.
In Kaplan and Str6mberg's analysis, sharing control with an independent director creates a
modified form of state-contingent control: "We interpret the situation where neither the VC
nor the founder is in control as similar to state-contingent control. For example, in boards
where ... [independent] board members are pivotal, it seems plausible that these members

will vote with the VC as founder performance declines." Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note
5, at 300. This analysis effectively collapses shared control into either E-control or VCcontrol depending on the state of nature. Bratton also considers a tie-breaking independent
director a substitute for state contingent control. See Bratton, supranote 14, at 919.
4 Bratton, supranote 14, at 918.
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In contrast, I model ID-arbitration directly, as a three-party decision-making
structure. I show that ID-arbitration can create incentives to compromise that are
not present under state-contingent control. By accounting for these incentives, I
show that ID-arbitration can prevent opportunistic conduct that would occur under
alternative governance arrangements.45
III. THE PROBLEM: ENTREPRENEUR AND INVESTOR OPPORTUNISM
This Part describes a hypothetical conflict between an entrepreneur holding
common stock and a VC holding preferred stock. Due to each party's respective
cash flow rights, the VC prefers a different strategy than the entrepreneur. The
firm's choice of action depends on who controls the board. Neither entrepreneur
control (E-control) nor VC-control, however, will lead to the efficient outcome,
creating both ex post and ex ante inefficiencies.
A. Model Setup: Hypothetical Conflict
Consider the following hypothetical problem: Startup Corporation, similar to
the majority of VC-backed firms, has authorized two classes of stock: common
stock and convertible preferred stock.4 6 Startup issued 100 shares of common stock
to its founder (the entrepreneur) and sold 100 shares of convertible preferred stock
at $1 per share to a VC investor (the VC). The VC's preferred shares carry a lX
liquidation preference plus any unpaid dividends (i.e. cumulative dividends). In
other words, if Startup is sold or liquidated the VC is entitled to receive $100 plus
unpaid dividends before the entrepreneur receives any payment. Each preferred
share may be converted at the VC's option into a single share of common stock.47
Upon a full conversion each party would own 100 shares of common stock.
Two years after investment, the VC's liquidation preference has increased to
$120 though unpaid dividends. At this time Startup must choose from one of three
45 ID-arbitration is a different mechanism from state-contingent control and may be
used even when verifiable signals are available. See Broughman, supra note 28, at 7.
46 A conflict between entrepreneurs and VCs can be caused by (1) private benefits
and/or (2) divergent cash flow rights. In the following hypothetical, I focus on cash flow
rights rather than private benefits. My reason for this emphasis is purely illustrative: cash
flows are easier to specify than private benefits. While there are some limitations to using
cash flow rights, this choice does not change the basic result of the model. See generally
Broughman, supra note 28 (reaching a similar finding using a model based on private
benefits). While the basic result of the two models is the same, there are some technical
differences. Most importantly, private benefits are non-transferable and cannot be directly
contracted over, while cash flow rights are endogenous to the financing contract. This
suggests that cash flow rights could always be realigned to remove the conflict; however,
as discussed in Part II, there are several reasons for the VCs' use of convertible preferred
stock.
47 This hypothetical assumes a pre-money valuation of .$100 and a post-money
valuation of $200.
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possible strategies: (1) a No-risk strategy; (2) a Low-risk strategy; or (3) a Highrisk strategy. The No-risk strategy entails a sale of the firm for $160. Startup has
already found a buyer who is willing to pay this amount, and the sale would not
involve any risk. If Startup declines the sale it must choose one of the other two
strategies by deciding how much to invest in a new technology (the R&D
investment). The Low-risk strategy requires a relatively small R&D investment,
while the High-risk strategy requires a larger R&D investment. The Low-risk and
the High-risk strategies each have a 50% chance of Success and a 50% chance of
Failure; however, the relative payoffs for Success and Failure depend on the level
of risk. Under the Low-risk strategy, Success yields a payoff of $240, and Failure
yields a payoff of $100. Under the High-risk strategy, Success yields a payoff of
$300, and Failure yields a payoff of $0. For ease of analysis, I assume the payoffs
under all three strategies are determined immediately, removing any timing
concerns. The three strategies are summarized in table 1:
Table 1: Alternative Strate ies
Strategy
Description
Outcomes

Expected Value

No-risk

Sale of firm

$160

Low-risk

Small R&D

Failure

50% * $100

Large R&D
investment

Failure
Success

50% * $0
50% * $300

.

investment

Success

$160
50% * $240

The expected payoff from each strategy is shown in the last column of table 1. The
Low-risk strategy has the greatest expected value ($170, versus $160 or $150), and
is the socially optimal choice.48 The question, however, is whether Startup will
pursue the optimal strategy.
Due to transaction costs, bounded rationality, or non-verifiable information,
the financing contract is incomplete and the parties cannot contract over this
decision.49 Instead Startup's choice of action depends on who controls the board of
directors.o I assume that none of the three strategies would violate the board's
fiduciary obligations, regardless of who controls the board (this assumption is
relaxed in Part VII)." The controlling party will select the strategy that maximizes
1 assume that the entrepreneur and the VC are both risk-neutral and there is no
discounting of uncertain payoffs.
49 Even if the parties could foresee this particular situation, it may not be cost48

effective to contract over remote possibilities, or it may be impossible to verify the relevant
conditions before a court.
so I assume that each strategy is sufficiently important to Startup's business to require
board authorization. Obviously, the sale of the firm would also require a shareholder vote.
For ease of analysis, however, I focus solely on board control.
5 Fiduciary obligations provide, at best, a weak constraint against opportunistic use
of control. See infra Part VII.
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its private interest, potentially at the expense of the firm's aggregate welfare.
Because of the preferred stock liquidation preference the parties have different
interests with respect to the three strategies.
No-Risk Strategy: The sale would yield an immediate payment of $160. The
preferred stock liquidation preference grants the VC the right to receive $120. On
the other hand, if the VC were to convert to common stock, it would own 100
shares of common stock and be entitled to half of the sale proceeds, giving the VC
$80 out of the $160 sale price. Consequently, the VC will elect to receive the full
liquidation preference of $120, and the entrepreneur will receive the residual sale
proceeds of $40.
Low-Risk Strategy: Startup makes a small R&D investment. Case 1: The
investment is a Success and the firm receives a payoff of $240. This payoff makes
the VC indifferent between converting to common stock and receiving its
liquidation preference. The VC will receive $120, and the entrepreneur will receive
the remaining $120.52 Case 2: The investment is a Failure and the firm receives a
total payoff of $100. The VC will not convert to common. Since the liquidation
preference ($120) exceeds the total payout ($100), the VC will receive the entire
amount by retaining its preferred stock. Given that there is an equal chance of
Success and Failure, the expected payoff to the VC from the Low-risk strategy is
$110, and the expected payoff to the entrepreneur is $60.
High-Risk Strategy: Startup makes a large R&D investment. Case 1: The
investment is a Success and the firm receives a payoff of $300. This payoff is
sufficiently high to cause the VC to convert to common. If the VC does not convert
it will simply receive the liquidation preference of $120. By converting, however,
the VC will hold half of the outstanding common stock and will receive $150
(50% of $300). The entrepreneur holds the remaining common stock and will also
receive $150. Case 2: The investment is a Failure, and both parties receive nothing.
Since there is a fifty percent chance of Success, under the High-risk strategy the
expected payoff to the VC is $75, and the expected payoff to the entrepreneur is
$75.5 These results are summarized in table 2.

This follows since converting to common stock would entitle the VC to half of
$240, which equals the VC's liquidation preference of $120.
5 The VC's expected payoff from the Low-risk strategy is (.5)$120 + (.5)$100 =
$110. The entrepreneur's expected payoff from the Low-risk strategy is (.5)$120 + (.5)$0 =
$60.
54 The VC's expected payoff from the High-risk strategy is (.5)$150 + (.5)$0 = $75.
The entrepreneur's expected payoff from the High-risk strategy is (.5)$150 + (.5)$0 = $75.
52
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Table 2: Party Payoffs

No-risk
Low-risk
High-risk

Expected
Value
$160

Expected.
Payoff to VC
$120

Expected Payoff
to Entrepreneur
$40

50%*$240

$170

$110

$60

50%*$0
50% * $300

$150

$75

$75

tO
$160

e

50% * $100

50% * $240

Because of the liquidation preference, the expected value of the VC's cash flow
right decreases with risk, while the entrepreneur's payoff increases with risk.55 As
this would suggest, the highest expected payoff for the VC comes from the No-risk
strategy, while the High-risk strategy gives the entrepreneur her best payoff.
Absent renegotiation, neither party has an incentive to pick the Low-risk strategy,
even though this is the efficient policy.
Ideally, the parties would foresee this problem ex ante and include a clause in
the original contract specifying that Startup will pursue the Low-risk strategy in
this particular scenario. However, such detailed contracting is often infeasible.
Despite such limitations, the parties can (consistent with empirical data) contract
over the allocation of board control, thereby determining who gets to select the
strategy Startup will pursue.56
The parties contract over three possible allocations of board control: (1) Econtrol, (2) VC-control, and (3) ID-arbitration. In the first two cases, either the
entrepreneur or the VC respectively controls a majority of Startup's board seats,
and can use this position to unilaterally select the firm's action. Under IDarbitration, the choice of action is the result of deliberation and voting among the
entrepreneur, the VC, and the independent director. To model the firm's decision
making under ID-arbitration, I consider a three-party bargaining process similar to
final-offer arbitration. The remainder of this Part models Startup's choice of action
under E-control and VC-Control. Part IV then examines Startup's choice of action
under ID-arbitration.

s5 This conflict motivates several studies. See, e.g., Broughman & Fried,supra note 5,
at 386-87 (suggesting that preferred stockholders are more likely to favor an immediate
sale of the firm than common stockholders); Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 993-96
(same).
56 In my model, board control is endogenous to the financing contract. For a similar
approach, see generally Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 11. The contracting literature
refers to such decision-making rights as residualcontrol. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman &
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. POL. EcON. 691, 691-92 (1986) (distinguishing between specific
contractual rights and residual control rights). From a normative perspective, the firm ought
to allocate residual control so as to minimize the cost of bad decisions.
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B. Board Control Without an Independent Director

Without an independent director, Startup's board will either be (1) contrdlled
by the entrepreneurs, (2) controlled by the VCs, or (3) the board will be
deadlocked. None of these arrangements is particularly desirable. I focus on Econtrol and VC-control rather than deadlock, since deadlock rarely occurs in VCbacked firms,57 and it is less efficient.58 E-control and VC-control, though
preferable to deadlock, are still susceptible to opportunistic behavior, creating both
ex post and ex ante inefficiency.
1. Ex Post Inefficiency

From an ex post perspective, the concern is whether Startup pursues the
efficient strategy after investment. As table 2 illustrates, neither party has an
incentive to pick the efficient outcome (the Low-risk strategy)., In each case, the
controlling party will use its position opportunistically, causing the firm to pursue
a strategy that benefits the controlling party at the expense of the firm's aggregate
welfare.o0
The parties may solve, or at least mitigate, the inefficient choice of action
through renegotiation. Under E-control, for example, the VC is likely to recognize
that the entrepreneur will pursue the High-risk strategy. To avoid this outcome the
VC may try to bargain with the entrepreneur ex post. There is an opportunity for a
Pareto improvement, since the aggregate payout under the Low-risk strategy is $20
higher than the aggregate payout under the High-risk strategy. This $20 difference
represents a potential renegotiation surplus.
I assume the parties have equal bargaining power and will split the surplus
evenly (the "Nash Bargaining Solution"). 6 1 Under E-control, the VC will offer to
pay the entrepreneur $25 if the entrepreneur agrees to pursue the Low-risk strategy

5

See infra Table 4.

Deadlock creates a risk of bilateral holdup, since either party can block any action.
See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 12, at 486 (proving that deadlock is less efficient than
giving control to the entrepreneur or the investor).
59 In practice, VCs may have other contractual protections against entrepreneur
opportunism, including participation rights, staged financing, protective provisions, and
redemption rights. See Sahlman, supra note 17, at 503-06. For a broader discussion of
available contractual protections, see William Camey, The Theory of the Firm: Investor
5

CoordinationCosts, Control Premiums, and CapitalStructure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 23-56

(1987). These rights may reduce, but not eliminate, the risk of entrepreneur opportunism.
At the same time, such provisions increase the risk of VC opportunism. See Gilson, supra
note 31, at 1085-86.
6 By assumption, none of the strategies violate the board's fiduciary obligations. The
possible impact of fiduciary obligations is considered in Part VII.
61 For a description of the Nash Bargaining Solution, see Ken Binmore, Ariel
Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, The Nash BargainingSolution in Economic Modelling, 17

RAND J. EcoN. 176, 176-79 (1986).
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instead of the High-risk strategy.6 2 This arrangement would benefit both parties.
The entrepreneur can expect to receive $85 after renegotiating to the Low-risk
strategy ($60 + $25), as opposed to $75 without renegotiation. The VC expects to
receive $85 after renegotiating ($110 - $25) as compared to $75 without
renegotiation.
A similar analysis applies under VC-control. Except now, the entrepreneur
must pay the VC to choose an alternative strategy. Assuming equal bargaining
power, the entrepreneur will offer to pay the VC $15 to switch to the Low-risk
strategy. This would make both parties better-off. After renegotiation, the
entrepreneur's expected payoff would go from $40 to $45, while the VC's
expected payoff would go from $120 to $125. These results are summarized in
table 3.
Table 3: Renegotiation
Without
Board Control Renegotiation
Choice
Entrepreneur
VC

High-risk
No-risk

Payoffs

E=75
V

=75

E=40

V = 10

Renegotiation
Payment
(Nash Bargaining
Solution)

After Renegotiation
Choice

Payoffs

E=-85

VC pays E $25

Low-risk

E pays VC $15

Low-risk

V = 85

E =45
V

-

125

Provided there are no transaction costs, and the parties have symmetric beliefs
and are not wealth constrained, renegotiation of this sort will always lead to the ex
post efficient outcome. This is a direct application of the Coase Theorem, with
board control analogous to a property right. 4 Consistent with the Coase Theorem,
ex post efficiency does not depend on the allocation of control in the ex ante
contract. The allocation of board control will have a distributional consequence-it
determines who has to bribe whom-but it should not affect the firm's ultimate
choice of action. There is evidence suggesting renegotiation of this sort is
sometimes used in the sale of VC-backed firm.65
The bargaining range is between $15 and $35. If the parties follow the Nash
Bargaining Solution they will agree to $25, splitting the surplus in half.
63 After renegotiation, the entrepreneur's expected payoff equals $45, which
is
determined by subtracting $15 (payment to the VC) from $60 (the entrepreneur's expected
payoff under the Low-risk Strategy). Similarly, after renegotiation, the VC's expected
payoff equals $125, which is determined by adding $15 (payment from the entrepreneur) to
$110 (the VC's expected payoff under the Low-risk Strategy).
6 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1
(1960). The incomplete contracting literature refers to control rights as property rights, in
part to emphasize the possibility of Coasian renegotiation in contractual settings. See, e.g.,
Grossman & Hart, supra note 56, at 718 (noting that residual control rights, similar to
Coasian property rights, can be renegotiated ex post).
65 In a study documenting the sale of VC-backed firms, Broughman and Fried find
that common stockholders at the target firm receive an additional "carveout" payment (i.e.
62
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There are several reasons, however, to question how often the assumptions
supporting Coasian renegotiation are satisfied. First, renegotiation may involve
significant transaction costs. The cost of renegotiation may increase if there are
several entrepreneurs or VCs (as is often the case in startup firms), or if it is
difficult to specify or enforce the new bargain. Such transaction costs may entirely
prevent renegotiation, or at least diminish the renegotiation surplus. Second, if the
parties have asymmetric beliefs, renegotiation may fail. It is often argued, for
instance, that entrepreneurs are overly optimistic. 67 The entrepreneur may
legitimately believe that the expected payoff from her preferred strategy is so high
that there is no bargaining range to negotiate over. Third, liquidity constraints may
limit the availability of renegotiation. The entrepreneur, for example, may have
limited wealth and thus be unable to pay the VC to take an alternative action.61 So,
while renegotiation could theoretically ensure an ex post efficient outcome, it may
be limited in practice.
Furthermore, the choice of action cannot be fully solved through contingent
control, a strategy emphasized by the financial contracting literature. 6 9 The
financing contract could award the VC extra board seats if the entrepreneur fails to
satisfy a financial milestone or other performance targets specified in the
contract. 1o Contingent control can be an improvement over both E-control and VCa side payment) from the VCs in approximately one-quarter of the recorded transactions.
Broughman & Fried, supra note 5, at 391-93. The VCs were more likely to offer such
carveout payments when the VCs did not control the board, and thus needed the consent of
common stockholders to sell the firm.
66 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital,Agency Costs, and the FalseDichotomy
of the Corporation,54 UCLA L. REv. 37, 64-70 (2006).
67 See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness,Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival:
A Theory of Venture Capital-FinancedFirms, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 45, 100-02 (2002).

68 This approach is exemplified by the model in Aghion & Bolton, supra note 12, at
473.(assuming the entrepreneur has no initial wealth), and in Hellmann, supra note 19, at
656 (suggesting that a wealth constrained entrepreneur may not be able to bribe the VC by
transferring additional shares of equity, since the entrepreneur's equity may be necessary
for incentive purposes).
69 See generally Aghion & Bolton, supra note 12 (emphasizing the benefits of
contingent control).
70 See id. Aghion and Bolton suggest that the standard debt financing contract is a
form of contingent control. See id at 490. In a typical debt financing, the entrepreneur
retains control of the firm as long as she does not default on the loan. Id. However, if the
entrepreneur defaults, the creditor typically has the right to take control of the firm
(through bankruptcy). Id. Kaplan and Str6mberg find evidence that contingent control is
used in VC-backed firms; however, it rarely applies to the board. See Kaplan & Str6mberg,
supra note 5, at 293. For example, in about 19% of the investment rounds in their sample,
the VCs gain the right to elect a majority of the firm's board if the company fails to redeem
preferred stock on demand. Id. This contingency, however, is less meaningful than it
appears. VCs typically do not obtain the right to redeem their shares until 5 years after
investment. Id. at 291. Even after this period, redemption is rarely in the VCs' interest,
since it would typically force a cash-strapped firm to liquidate itself at below market value.
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control. 7 ' However, it cannot solve the hypothetical problem illustrated above for
the simple reason that neither the entrepreneur nor the VC would select the
efficient outcome if given control.72 At best, contingent control may pick the lesser
of two inefficiencies.
Finally, protective provisions cannot generally solve the problem. In some
instances a protective provision held by the non-controlling party may prevent an
opportunistic outcome. For example, a VC may hold a protective provision
requiring its consent before any amendments can be made to the firm's corporate
charter. The VC may use this provision to block the entrepreneur from pursuing
excessive financing (which generally requires a charter amendment to create a new
class of preferred stock), even if the entrepreneur controls the board. In this
particular example, the protective provision may prevent a suboptimal outcome
(excessive financing). However, protective provisions generally do not solve the
problem, for two reasons. First, the non-controlling party would need a protective
provision to cover every possible instance of controlling party opportunism, which
is an impossible requirement given contractual incompleteness. Second, and more
importantly, protective provisions create a problem of bilateral holdup. The party
protected by the protective provision could threaten to block desirable outcomes as
well as undesirable ones. The protective provision effectively creates a form of
deadlock, since the consent of both the controlling party and the protected party is
necessary for the board to take any affirmative action.
2. Ex Ante Inefficiency
Even if renegotiation can sometimes lead to the ex post efficient outcome, it
cannot solve the ex ante problem. From an ex ante perspective, the concern is
whether the parties will enter into the contract. The VC and the entrepreneur both
need to be assured that their expected return from the project is greater than its
cost, in terms of financial investment and lost opportunities. If this condition is not
satisfied, the affected party will not enter into the contract in the first place.

Kaplan and Stromberg find only one firm where the allocation of board seats is contingent
on a contractual measure of financial performance. Id.
71 The entrepreneur's incentives may be better aligned with the firm's
overall welfare
when the firm is performing well, while the VC's interests are better aligned with the
firm's overall welfare when the firm is performing poorly. If the contract can award control

to the entrepreneur when the firm is performing well, and to the VC when the firm is
performing poorly, it is easy to see how this arrangement could be an improvement over E-

control and over VC-control.
72 When there are more than two actions to choose from, as is the case in the
hypothetical discussed above, contingent control will be inadequate whenever the efficient
outcome is not either party's first choice.
7 In the extreme, one could imagine a very broad protective provision that would
require the non-controlling party's consent before any board action can be taken. This is
functionally identical to deadlock.
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Following the economic literature, I refer to this as the "participation" constraint.74
I first consider the problem from the VC's perspective and then from the
entrepreneur's perspective.
Recall that the VC makes an initial investment of $100 in exchange for shares
of preferred stock. If we assume an interest rate of zero and no outside options, the
VC's participation constraint is satisfied whenever its expected payoff is greater
than $100. Because the VC's expected payoff depends on the allocation of board
control, some board configurations may satisfy the VC's participation constraint
while others violate it. If the VC controls the board it can ensure that its
participation constraint is satisfied. The VC will use its board control to select the
No-risk strategy. This gives the VC an expected payoff of $120, which is greater
than its initial investment of $100.
The VC's participation constraint, however, is not satisfied under E-control.
As noted above, the entrepreneur will select the High-risk strategy if she controls
the board. This strategy gives the VC a lower expected payoff ($75) than its initial
investment ($100). Recognizing the problem, the VC will refuse to invest under Econtrol.
A similar ex ante problem can be seen from the entrepreneur's perspective.
While the entrepreneur may not invest much money into Startup, she may be
leaving a high paying job at an established firm to work for Startup. The benefits
she received from her previous job are an opportunity cost, analogous to the VC's
financial investment. The entrepreneur will only enter into the project if her
expected benefits from Startup exceed her opportunity cost. To illustrate, assume
the entrepreneur would receive $50 from her previous job. To ensure the
entrepreneur's participation, Startup must pledge expected benefits greater than
$50 to the entrepreneur. This constraint is satisfied when the entrepreneur controls
the board (payoff = $75), but not when the VC controls the board (payoff = $40).
If we simultaneously consider both parties' participation constraints we
immediately see a serious problem. The VC will refuse to invest under E-control
and the entrepreneur will refuse to invest under VC-control. If E-control and VCcontrol are the only possible board configurations, Startup will never get off the
ground, since neither arrangement ensures the participation of both parties. This
problem occurs despite the fact that the project is socially desirable. If the parties
could somehow agree to follow the Low-risk strategy, the expected surplus would
be $170, which is greater than the sum of the entrepreneur's opportunity cost ($50)
74 This is often called the "individual rationality" constraint, and in the financing
literature it is sometimes referred to as the investor's "financing" constraint. Regardless of
the terminology, the concept is the same.
7 My discussion here is based on the implicit assumption that the VC and the
entrepreneur can forecast, at the time of the ex ante contract, their expected return under

each allocation of board control. This may be an unrealistic assumption; however, even if
the VC cannot forecast this particular scenario, it can recognize the general problem: giving
control to the entrepreneur exposes the VC to opportunistic action in numerous situations
that may arise. The risk of opportunistic conduct (even if it cannot be precisely forecast)
may cause some VCs to refuse to invest ex ante if the entrepreneurs demand control.
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and the VC's investment ($100). The problem is the controlling party cannot
credibly tie its hands and commit to the efficient outcome.
Part III.B.1 explains that renegotiation could lead to the ex post efficient
outcome under certain assumptions, but renegotiation cannot generally solve ex
ante inefficiency. The trouble is that the distributive consequences of renegotiation
become important when considering the ex ante problem. The non-controlling
party must pay the controlling party a sufficient amount to ensure that the
controlling party benefits from the renegotiation. This payment is subtracted from
the non-controlling party's ex ante expected benefits, hindering efforts to satisfy
participation constraints through renegotiation.77
Rather than solving the problem of ex ante inefficiency, renegotiation can
actually make the situation worse. The availability of renegotiation gives the
controlling party an incentive to endogenously create additional hold-up
opportunities. This may give the controlling party leverage to demand additional
concessions from the other party. For example, a controlling VC may threaten to
replace the entrepreneur as CEO. In response the entrepreneur may make various
concessions to keep her job. The VC, however, can make the same threat the next
month, demanding further concessions, The ideal solution is not renegotiation but
a mechanism that allows both parties to commit to non-opportunistic behavior. The
next Part considers whether adding an independent director to the board provides
such a commitment mechanism.

IV.

THE SOLUTION: INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR ARBITRATION

Independent directors expand the menu of governance structures that a firm
may consider. In particular, the entrepreneur and VC may share control of the
board with an independent director as tiebreaker (ID-arbitration), an arrangement
frequently used in firms financed by venture capital. In this Part, I consider the
simplest form of shared control, a board with three directors: one entrepreneur, one

76

This problem is a variation of the famous holdup problem considered in corporate

governance and contracting literature. See generally Williamson, supra note 11 (arguing

that the threat of ex post holdup may cause underinvestment ex ante); Grossman & Hart,
supra note 56 (same).
n The renegotiation described in table 3 illustrates the problem. For example,
assuming equal bargaining power, under E-control, the VC pays the entrepreneur $25 to

switch to the Low-risk strategy. After renegotiation, the VC's expected payoff is $85.
While this is better than the VC's expected payoff without renegotiation, it does not satisfy
the VC's ex ante participation constraint, since the payoff remains less than the VC's initial
investment of $100. The analogous problem exists from the entrepreneur's perspective. See
supra Table 3.
7 The independent director also allows other governance arrangements, which I do
not consider. For example, independent directors could hold enough board seats to
constitute a strict majority. An independent director majority, while now required in
publicly-held firms, is unusual in VC-backed firms.
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VC, and one independent director." I show that ID-arbitration will lead to the
efficient outcome, provided the independent director is relatively unbiased. With
an unbiased independent director, ID-arbitration can remedy both ex post and ex
ante inefficiency.
A. ArbitrationSetup

I model the choice of action under ID-arbitration with a structured bargaining
process similar to final-offer arbitration. The entrepreneur and VC will each
propose a strategy. If they propose the same strategy, there is no disagreement, and
Startup will pursue this strategy regardless of the independent director. However, if
they propose different actions, the independent director must choose between the
two proposals. Similar to an arbitrator under final-offer arbitration, the independent
director cannot introduce a compromise. Rather, she must simply vote for one of
the two proposals put forward by the parties. This bargaining process reflects the
fact that the independent director is not one of the firm's primary constituencies
and typically plays a more passive role in management than the entrepreneur and

VC.

This bargaining game illustrates two points. First, when the entrepreneur and
the VC agree on a strategy the independent director is irrelevant. The entrepreneur
79 Not all firms that share control with an independent director have this exact
structure. A startup's board may include more than three directors or multiple
representatives from each group. I focus on this three-member board, however, because it
is the most basic form of ID-arbitration, and the incentives generally apply to other forms
of shared control. There are two caveats to this point. First, in firms with multiple

entrepreneurs or VCs sitting on the board, my model of ID-arbitration captures the relevant
incentives provided that the entrepreneurs have similar interests and the investors have
similar interests. This is generally a reasonable assumption since each group holds similar
cash flow rights (i.e., the entrepreneurs all hold common stock and the VCs hold various
classes of preferred stock). There are, however, some reasons why the interests of early
VCs may diverge from later round investors. See Bartlett,supra note 66, at 71-80; see also

Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. Civ.A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423, at
*2-4 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002) (describing a conflict between different classes of preferred

stock). The possibility of conflicts between different VCs (or between entrepreneurs) does
not necessarily remove the benefits of an independent director as arbitrator; however, it
would require additional analysis of voting and coalition formation that is not considered
here.
Second, the board may be structured so that either the entrepreneurs or the VCs hold
exactly half the board seats. For example, a four-member board could have two VCs, one
entrepreneur, and one independent director. Since they hold half the seats, the VCs can
effectively veto any action that they do not support. This arrangement favors the status quo
by giving the VC a blanket veto right. The VCs, however, do not hold a majority, and thus
need the support of the independent director to take any affirmative action opposed by the
entrepreneur. Therefore, my analysis of ID-arbitration is still relevant to understanding
decision-making in boards with this type of structure (at least for actions requiring

affirmative board authorization).
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and VC already have a majority of the board votes (two out of three). Thus, they
can cause Startup to take the proposed action even without the independent
director's support. This is important since it means that the independent director
cannot holdup the firm. Second, when the entrepreneur and the VC disagree the
independent director casts the tie-breaking vote, effectively arbitrating the dispute.
B. ArbitrationResults

Under ID-arbitration, the entrepreneur and VC anticipate how the independent
director is likely to vote if a conflict should arise. This knowledge affects the
strategies that the entrepreneur and the VC will propose ex ante. There is no point
in proposing a strategy that will be rejected by the independent director, as this
would effectively let the other party -select the firm's course of action. Instead the
parties have an incentive to offer a strategic compromise-a proposal that is likely
to be endorsed by the independent director and yet is still acceptable to the
proposing party. The literature on final-offer arbitration shows that disputing
parties have an incentive to converge upon the outcome favored (or deemed "fair")
by the arbitrator.80
To illustrate with a concrete example, Major League Baseball salary disputes
are frequently resolved through final-offer arbitration. The player and the team
each propose a salary to the arbitrator. If either party were to propose an extreme
salary (either too high or too low) it will be rejected by the arbitrator, and the other
party's proposal accepted. To prevent this outcome both parties have an incentive
to make reasonable proposals, trying to win over the arbitrator. In theory, with
perfect information, the disputing parties will propose the exact same salary-the
amount deemed "fair" by the arbitrator-and there will be no dispute to arbitrate.
A similar logic motivates the median voter theorem in political science. In
two-party electoral competition the platforms of candidates from rival parties
should converge upon the preferences of the median voter. They have an incentive
to converge on the median, since otherwise the other party will win.82
Under ID-Arbitration, the entrepreneur and VC effectively create a median
voter by adding an independent director to their board. In so doing the parties
implicitly commit to the independent director's preferred outcome whenever they
80

See Vincent P. Crawford, On Compulsory-ArbitrationSchemes, 87 J. POL. ECON.

131, 131-32 (1979).

See Daniel R. Marburger, Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer Arbitration:
Evidence from Major League Baseball, 42 EcON. INQUIRY 60, 60-62 (2004). In practice,
81

evidence from MLB arbitration shows partial convergence to the player's "fair" salary. See
id. The team typically proposes a slightly lower salary than the player. See id. The small
gap between the two salary proposals reflects the fact that parties do not have perfect
information regarding the arbitrator's notion of a "fair" salary, though they may have a
reasonable guess. See id.
82 See Downs, supra note 15, at 138, 142-45; see also ROBERT COOTER, THE
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 25-27 (2000) (explaining why party platforms tend to converge
towards the center of the political distribution).
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might otherwise disagree. Competition for the independent director's support
causes the parties to converge upon the strategy favored by the independent
director. This avoids the problem of controlling party opportunism and replaces it
with the preferences of the independent director.
Finding an unbiased independent director is critical. If the independent
director always sides with the same party or otherwise colludes with one of the
primary parties this arrangement is no different than giving the entrepreneur or VC
control. A biased independent director effectively gives the favored party an extra
board seat. On the other hand, if the independent director is unbiased in some
meaningful sense, the parties can commit to a more efficient outcome-through
ID-arbitration-than is possible through alternative governance arrangements.
I characterize an unbiased independent director as one who places equal
weight on the financial interests of the entrepreneur and the VC, and a biased
independent director as one who favors the interests of one party over the other.
Since Startup's aggregate welfare equals the sum of the entrepreneur's interest and
the VC's interest, an unbiased independent director will favor strategies that
maximize the firm's aggregate welfare.
It immediately follows that ID-arbitration with an unbiased independent
director leads to the most efficient outcome. In competing for the independent
director's support, the entrepreneur and VC converge upon the welfare maximizing
strategy. Intuitively, this is easiest to see in settings, like baseball salary arbitration,
where the firm can choose from a continuum of possible strategies. For example, a
firm may need to decide how much money to invest in a new technology. In these
settings, both the entrepreneur and VC will propose the independent director's
preferred outcome and there will be no dispute to arbitrate.83
In the hypothetical described in Part III, the firm must choose from a discrete
set of possible actions. This modifies the analysis slightly;, however, the parties
still converge towards the efficient outcome. To illustrate, an unbiased independent
director will prefer the Low-risk strategy (first choice), over the No-risk strategy
(second choice), and over the High-risk strategy (third choice). The entrepreneur
recognizes that the High-risk strategy is the independent director's least preferred
outcome. Consequently, the entrepreneur will not propose the High-risk strategy,
even though it is her first choice, since she knows that the independent director
will vote against it regardless of what the VC proposes. In fact, proposing the
High-risk strategy could result in the No-risk strategy being pursued. The No-risk
strategy is the entrepreneur's least preferred outcome. To avoid this result the
entrepreneur will compromise and propose the Low-risk strategy-the independent
director's first choice and. the entrepreneur's second choice-instead. The
entrepreneur's strategic compromise causes the parties to converge towards the

For a proof of convergence over a continuous action space, see Broughman, supra
note 28, at 21.
83
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independent director's preferred outcome.8 I provide a game theory analysis of
this discrete action space bargaining game in the Appendix.
What is important to recognize is that ID-arbitration with an unbiased
independent director causes the parties to converge directly upon the efficient
outcome. This result does not require renegotiation. Also, the parties do not need to
draft a detailed contract specifying this action ex ante. ID-arbitration is consistent
with incomplete contracting assumptions. Instead of contractual specification, the
parties rely on the independent director being able to identify the desirable action
at the time a choice needs to be made. Under ID-arbitration the parties can adjust
to a rapidly changing business environment - without advance contractual
specifications and without opportunistic behavior by a controlling party.
Furthermore, ID-arbitration can prevent opportunistic conduct without the
need to resort to costly litigation. Fiduciary obligations under corporate law might
be an alternative way to prevent opportunistic conduct; however, for reasons
discussed in Part VII, fiduciary obligations are a weak constraint on opportunistic
conduct by either party. That ID-arbitration is the most common board
arrangement may be a direct consequence of the courts' inability to effectively
police opportunistic conduct. Regardless of the reason, ID-arbitration suggests a
private solution to the problem of opportunism.
Despite its benefits, ID-arbitration is potentially limited by various
considerations. First, the independent director needs sufficient information to be
able to identify the efficient strategy. Second, the independent director should not
collude with (i.e. accept bribes from) the primary parties. Third, the independent
director may be biased for various reasons. However, even if the independent
director makes mistakes, turns out to be biased, or otherwise colludes with one of
the primary parties, the result is no worse than E-control or VC-control. Since the
independent director does not have sufficient board seats to holdup the firm or
unilaterally control the choice of action. The worst that can happen is the
independent director .will support the entrepreneur's (or VC's) proposal, even
though it is inefficient.
If the independent director is unbiased, ID-arbitration can improve ex post
and ex ante efficiency compared to alternative governance arrangements. The next
subsection considers the independent director's incentives.
C. Independent DirectorMotivations
Independent directors may be motivated by several considerations. Business
norms or a significant relationship with one of the two parties may cause an
independent director to favor one side over the other. For example, commentators
argue that VCs, who are repeat players and have extensive professional networks,
may use their position to informally control the selection and behavior of
8 In the discrete action game, there are technically two Nash Equilibria (the VC is
indifferent between proposing the No-risk and Low-risk strategies). See discussion infra
Appendix.
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independent directors.85 Alternatively, independent directors may be motivated by
financial interests. Independent directors in VC-backed firms are often given a
small share of common stock for their services. Since entrepreneurs also hold
common stock, the independent director's equity position may help align his
interests with those of the entrepreneur.
Independent directors, however, typically hold a very small share of common
stock and this may be insufficient to bias the independent director in a significant
way (or it may simply offset the natural bias in favor of VCs). Finally, independent
directors also may be influenced by considerations of fairness or altruism.86
While I acknowledge that each of the above considerations may influence
independent director behavior, I focus on two considerations-loyalty and
reelection-related to the independent director's appointment. First, independent
directors may feel a sense of loyalty to whichever party nominated them for the
position. Loyalty is often used to explain the motivations of directors in publicly
held firms. 87 Second, an independent director may desire to be appointed to the
board of other startup firms in the future. This is analogous to the incentive for
political reelection. A politician must perform well in her current job and satisfy
important constituents if she hopes to be elected to additional positions in the
future. Similarly, an independent director's performance on Startup's board may
impact whether he is appointed to other firms in the future. Independent directors
obtain some benefit from serving on a startup's board, both the immediate
financial compensation paid to the director, and probably more importantly, the
access to valuable contacts and information about the relevant industry that the
director gains from the experience. To continue receiving such benefits an
independent director must satisfy the corporate constituencies that have the power
to nominate (and potentially to remove) directors.
Under both the loyalty and the reelection motives, the independent director's
interests are shaped by the nominating party (or parties). In VC-backed firms,
which party-the entrepreneur, the VC, or possibly both-has the power to select
independent directors? According to Kaplan and Strdmberg's empirical study,
independent director board seats "are to be filled by individuals mutually agreed
upon by the VCs and the founders/entrepreneurs." 89 Kaplan and Str6mberg,
however, do not explain the evidence for this view, and some legal scholars
disagree with their characterization. Smith, for example, examines corporate
charters from a large sample of VC-backed firms. 90 He concludes, based on an
See Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 988.
See generally Lynn A. Stout, On the ProperMotives of Corporate
Directors (Or,
Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1 (2003) (arguing that corporate directors behave altruistically).
87 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE
85

86

31, 61-79 (2004).
See Blair & Stout, supra note 8, at 315 (arguing that a director's reputation may

UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
88

affect her likelihood of being appointed to other boards).
89 See Kaplan & Stramberg, supra note
5, at 287.
90 See infra note 114 and
accompanying text.
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alternative interpretation of formal contract language, that independent director
board seats will either be controlled by the entrepreneurs or by the VCs, depending
on who holds more equity at the time.9' Fried and Ganor, while not questioning
Kaplan and Strbmberg's formal interpretation, suggest that VCs may still have
substantial informal control over the selection of independent directors.92
The answer to this unresolved empirical question affects incentives. If
independent directors are typically -nominated or otherwise chosen by a firm's
VCs, then independent directors have an incentive to favor the interests of the VC
when forced to settle disputes between the two parties.93 Conversely, if
entrepreneurs typically control independent director appointments, independent
directors would have an incentive to favor the interests of the entrepreneur.
On the other hand, if independent director board seats are filled by mutual
agreement, the independent director would have an incentive to be impartial. The
independent director would feel loyal to both parties and would want to avoid
developing a bad reputation among either entrepreneurs or VCs. This point is
confirmed by data on arbitrator selection in other contexts. For example, Bloom
and Cavanagh record data on arbitrator selection in employment disputes involving
New Jersey fire and police officers when the final arbitrator is selected from a list
of seven potential arbitrators, and the employer and employee can each veto up to
three names from the list. 94 Bloom and Cavanagh find that arbitrators who
consistently favor one side in disputes are more likely to be vetoed by the
disfavored side in future arbitrations, and are consequently less likely to serve as
an arbitrator in the future. 9 5 Similarly, independent directors appointed by mutual
agreement have an incentive to resolve disputes in an impartial manner. If an
independent director develops a bad reputation among the broader community of
entrepreneurs or VCs, he is unlikely to be appointed to serve on future boards.

91 See infra note 115 and accompanying text. Smith's data is based primarily on
corporate charters rather than on voting rights agreements. See Smith, supra note 30, at
325-26.
92 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 988; see also Utset, supra note 67, at 105
(stating that VCs are likely to have de facto control over the selection of independent
directors due to the VCs' extensive professional networks).
9 Future appointments to other firms may not involve the same entrepreneur or the
same VCs. Consequently, I am assuming that an independent director develops a reputation
among the broader community of entrepreneurs and VCs based on his performance as a
director of Startup. For example, if the independent director consistently favors the VC's
interests, this increases the likelihood that other VCs (or decreases the likelihood that other
entrepreneurs) will want to appoint this individual. My analysis assumes at least some
minimal ability of the community of entrepreneurs and VCs to communicate among
themselves regarding the characteristics of a potential independent director. This
communication need not be perfect, but for the reputational effects to be meaningful, it
must be loosely correlated with the independent director's traits.
94
See David E. Bloom & Christopher L. Cavanagh, An Analysis of the Selection of
Arbitrators,76 AM. ECON. REV. 408 (1986).
9

Id. at 416-18.
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V. DATA ON STARTUP BOARDS AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR APPOINTMENTS

If independent directors perform the arbitration role that I suggest, we should
see evidence of this in the selection of independent directors.96 In particular, we
should see various steps taken to ensure that independent directors are unbiased. I
predict that independent directors will be mutually nominated by the consent of the
firm's entrepreneurs and VCs. I expect this to show up both in formal appointment
97
rights and in the actual selection of independent directors.
These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence from VC contracts. I
consider data from a sample of VC-backed firms located in Silicon Valley. After
describing the data source, I present summary statistics on the use of independent
directors. Then, I describe how independent directors are selected, through formal
appointment rights and informal appointment practices. Finally, I provide
additional data on reputational ties and background qualifications for the
independent directors in my sample. This data illustrates numerous safeguards that
entrepreneurs and VCs use to ensure a relatively unbiased independent director.

96

In this Article, I focus on appointment rights and other issues related to the

selection of independent directors. My theory, however, also predicts which firms are likely

to use ID-arbitration. Startup firms are more likely to use ID-arbitration when participation
constraints preclude the use of either E-control or VC-control. The VC's participation
constraint depends on the amount invested, while the entrepreneur's participation
constraint depends on her alternative employment opportunities. Neither party will enter
into the contract if their participation constraint is violated. Thus, I predict that, ceteris
paribus, Startup is more likely to use ID-arbitration relative to E-control (or less likely to
use ID-arbitration relative to VC-control) as the amount invested by the VC increases. On
the other hand, the entrepreneur's outside employment opportunities should have the
reverse effect: Startup is less likely to use ID-arbitration relative to E-control (or more
likely to use ID-arbitration relative to VC-control) as the value of the entrepreneur's
alternative employment opportunities increases. I test these hypotheses in a separate article.
See Broughman, supra note 28, at 18-20. I find that the VC demands more control when
there is greater uncertainty or risk regarding the firm's financial viability and as the VC
invests more money into the project. The VC's participation constraint has the predicted
effect, suggesting that ID-arbitration is sometimes used to ensure the VC's participation. I
do not, however, test the entrepreneur's participation constraint, since data on the
entrepreneur's outside employment opportunities is unavailable.
97 I assume the entrepreneur and VC know how the independent director will vote
(implicit in this assumption is that the independent director will not make any errors if
asked to arbitrate). In reality, however, there may be some uncertainty regarding the
independent director's behavior. Uncertainty, while reducing the benefits of ID-arbitration,
does not change the basic implications of my theory. See Broughman, supra note 28, at 1416.
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A. Data Source

I use hand-collected data regarding fifty-four VC-backed firms located in
Silicon Valley that were sold to an acquirer in 2003 or 2004. To gather additional
information about independent director qualifications I sent follow-up surveys to
each entrepreneur two years after the original interview. Entrepreneurs from thirtytwo out of the original fifty-four firms completed the follow-up survey.
I collected data on the allocation of cash flow rights and control rights. I
document board control and director appointments following each round of
financing and at the sale of the firm. Since board composition is separately
negotiated in each round of financing, the financing contract is the relevant unit of
analysis and each firm may represent several data points.
Because my sample is limited to Silicon Valley firms sold in 2003 or 2004,
factors unique to the Silicon Valley VC market, to acquired firms, or to this time
period could limit the generalizability of my findings. Silicon Valley is a close-knit
community where reputational considerations are particularly important. 99 In
addition, firms in the sample population were sold several years after the tech
bubble collapsed. Furthermore, I do not observe firms that elected to remain
independent. Each of these considerations may have affected the allocation of
board control and the use of independent directors. Consequently, my data on
independent director appointments may reflect factors unique to the sample
population.
These concerns limit the interpretations that can be drawn from the data, but
they do not undermine my basic results. The data are used primarily to illustrate
governance practices relating to the selection of independent directors. I do not use
regressions to statistically test my predictions, and thus I do not need to worry
about selection bias affecting coefficient estimates. Rather, my concern is whether

98 This data was collected with Jesse Fried in connection with a separate research
project. Details on the sample frame and methodology can be found in Broughman &
Fried, supra note 5, at 387-88. A brief summary of our data gathering efforts follows: We
first obtained from www.VentureReporter.net a list of all VC-backed companies located in
Silicon Valley (broadly defined to include the entire San Francisco Bay Area) that were
sold to an acquirer in 2003 or 2004. Id. at 387. For each firm we identified current business
addresses for the entrepreneurs (i.e. founders or senior executives) of the subject firm. Id.
The original sample included 193 firms that met our criteria. See id. We were able to find
business addresses for a founder or CEO from 141 of the 193 businesses. Id We mailed
letters soliciting an interview from entrepreneurs at each firm and promised to keep the
information confidential, hiding the identity of the entrepreneur and the startup firm. Id.
Entrepreneurs from 57 of the 141 firms agreed to be interviewed-a response rate of
40.4%. Id. For the current project, 3 firms had to be removed due to incomplete data,
leaving a relevant sample of 54 firms.
99 See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman, & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator:
Lawyers and the Suppressionof Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
679, 697-703 (1996).
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the documented governance practices are reflective of startup firms generally. In
most cases, the allocation of board seats was determined years before the firm was
sold, at a time when the parties may have contemplated an IPO (initial public
offering) or other form of exit. Also, the allocation of board control and the use of
independent directors in my sample are similar to other empirical studies of startup
firms from outside Silicon Valley and from other time periods.' 00 This suggests
that the use of independent directors is not unique to my sample.
The primary benefit of using this dataset is that it contains detailed
quantitative and qualitative data on the background and selection of each
independent director. To my knowledge, this type of information is not available in
any other existing database.
B. Summary Statistics

The sample firms are primarily from the biotech, telecommunications,
software, and internet sectors. This concentration of IT-related businesses is
representative of VC financing in general. The firms received on average $45
million in VC financing over five years of operation and three rounds of financing.
At the time of the sale, the VC's aggregate liquidation preferences were on average
1.25 times the amount invested. Results are summarized below (see table 4).
I divide directors into three categories: (1) VC, (2) entrepreneur, and (3)
independent director. This classification is based on which party-VCs holding
preferred stock or entrepreneurs holding common stock-has the right to appoint
each director.101 Independent directors (at least formally speaking) are appointed
by holders of both classes of stock. Panel C reports the mean allocation of board
seats for all rounds of financing (n=154), and separately for the first round of
financing (n=54). The first round of financing may be more relevant to my setting
since it involves only one class of preferred stock, 10 2 and the resulting board
configuration does not depend on the allocation of control in prior rounds of
financing. Regardless of whether I focus exclusively on the first round, however,
the results show a similar use of independent directors.
A startup board has an average of 5.5 directors (the first round board is
slightly smaller). For all rounds of financing, VCs hold on average 43.9% of the
board seats, entrepreneurs hold 33%, and the remaining board seats, 23.1% of the
total, are held by independent directors. The first round results are similar, except
entrepreneur representation (38.6%) is somewhat higher and VC representation
(36.4%) is somewhat lower. In both cases, however, independent directors
constitute about one quarter of the board. For purposes of comparison, I include
100 See Kaplan & Strimberg, supra note 5, at 287-88; see also Dow JONES,
VENTUREONE DEAL TERMS REPORT 18-19 (Russ Garland ed., 3d ed. 2005) (describing
data from a nationwide survey of VC-backed firms regarding board composition).
01 Angel investors are classified based on their equity holdings.
102 First round financings avoid complications related to possible conflicts among
different classes of VCs. See Bartlett, supra note 66, at 71-80 (describing conflicts among
different classes of preferred stock).

[No. 3

UTAH LAW REVIEW

490

the allocation of board seats reported by Kaplan and Stromberg-their results
(from a nationwide sample of startup firms) are similar to mine, suggesting that the
use of independent directors is not unique to Silicon Valley or other features of my
sample. 0 3
Table 4 (panel C) also shows the allocation of control for each financing
round, divided into four categories: (1) VC-control, (2) E-control, (3) Deadlock,
and (4) Arbitration. VC-control and E-control occur when the respective party
holds more than 50% of the board seats. Deadlock occurs when the entrepreneurs
and VCs each hold exactly 50% of the board seats. Arbitration occurs when neither
the VCs nor the entrepreneurs control more than 50% of the board seats and one or
more independent directors hold the tie-breaking vote. Arbitration is a
generalization of the simple three member board-ID-arbitration-discussed
above. Arbitration is by far the most frequent category, representing 64.3% of all
financing rounds and 70.3% of first round financings. E-control and VC-control
account for most of the remaining financing rounds, with Deadlock rarely used.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for a sample of fifty-four VC-backed
firms sold in 2003 or 2004. Panel A shows industry distribution. The industry for
each company is determined by the sector classification provided by
www.linksv.com. Panel B reports the mean and median period of operation,
number of financing rounds, amount invested, sale price, and liquidation
preferences (LP) for the sample firms. Panel C shows the allocation of board seats
and board control in my sample firms, and in Kaplan and Str6mberg's 2003 study
of VC contracts. 1 4 Data is presented for all rounds of financing and for the first
round separately.
PanelA: Industry Distributionof Companies

Sample firms (n=54)

Sector
Biotech
8

Telecom
13

Software
12

Internet
10

Other IT
11

# obs.
54
54
54
49
51
51

Mean
5.26
3
45.37
54.62
48.10
1.25

Med.
5
3
31
24.25
36
1

SD
2.17
1.08
45.8
105.49
38.95
0.62

PanelB: FinancingOverview

Years of Operation
Number of Financing Rounds
Amount Invested (millions $)
Sale Price (millions $)
Aggregate LP (millions $)
LP divided by amount invested
103
'

See Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 5, at 287-88.
See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Panel C: Allocation of Board Seats and Board Control

Board Seats
% VC Seats
% Entrepreneur Seats
% Ind. Director Seats

Broughman and Fried
All Rounds First Round
(n=54)
(n=154)
4.6
5.5
36.4
43.9
38.6
33.0
25.0
23.1

Kaplan and Stromberg
All Rounds First Round
(n=95)
(n=201)
5.7
6.0
37.0
41.4
38.5
35.4
24.5
23.2

% Firms
VC-Control
E-Control
Arbitration
Deadlock'05

24.7
7.1
64.3
3.9

25.4
13.9
60.7
n/a

Mean

9.3
14.8
70.3
5.6

11.6
20.0
68.4
n/a

C. Selection ofIndependent Directors
My sample includes a total of eighty-four independent directors, many of
whom sit on the firm's board through multiple rounds of financing. This Part
explains how these individuals were selected and provides additional data on
reputational ties and background qualifications of the independent directors.
1. Appointment Rights
In VC-backed firms, board seats are allocated on a class-slecific basis. This is
specifically negotiated in each round of financing and is typically specified in the
corporate charter and in a voting rights agreement. The charter determines how
many board seats are elected by each series of preferred and common stock. The
charter, however, is generally not the decisive document for the selection of
independent directors. While the charter may address the issue, more specific
language is typically included in the voting rights agreement. The following
provision is illustrative:
In any election of directors of the Company to elect the [Independent]
Directors, the Investors and the Founders shall each vote at any regular
or special meeting of stockholders (or by written consent) such number
of voting securities of the Company then owned by them.

..

as may be

105Kaplan and Str6mberg do not separately code for deadlock. Rather, they classify
all finns where neither VCs nor founders/entrepreneurs control the board as "shared
control." See id.
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necessary to elect two (2) directors unanimously approved by each of
the [other directors of the Company].
The "other directors of the company" include all of the directors appointed by
the entrepreneurs and appointed by the VCs. This provision effectively ensures that
any independent director will be mutually appointed by preferred and common
stockholders. 06 In other voting agreements from my sample, the independent
director must be "approved by a majority of the Common Stock voting separately
as a class and a majority of the Preferred Stock voting separately as a class." Each
of these provisions formally ensures that the entrepreneurs and VCs both approve
the selection of an outside director before she can be appointed to the board.
Unfortunately, only a small number of firms from my sample shared their full
set of contractual documents, including voting rights agreements.107 However, each
such firm included a voting agreement with language similar to the above
provision, ensuring a "mutually" appointed director.
To make sure this practice is widely used I also consider published resources
documenting VC contracting terms. The National Venture Capital Association
(NVCA) provides on their website a set of model legal documents "intended to
reflect current practices and customs."108 These documents were prepared by a
group of leading venture capital attorneys.109 The standard term sheet provided by
NVCA includes a voting agreement as part of the set of legal documents executed
in connection with a round of VC financing."o Furthermore, the voting agreement
provided by NVCA uses language very similar to the provision above, requiring
that any outside directors be "mutually acceptable" to a majority of the Founders
and VCs voting separately."' Other industry publications are consistent with
NVCA on this issue.'l2
To be sure, there is some confusion regarding the appointment of independent
directors, since the standard charter provision does.not mirror the language used in
the voting agreement. The charter typically authorizes the holders of common and
Id. at 287 (describing the outside directors in their study as mutually appointed).
107 Other than corporate charters, which we were able to obtain from the secretary of
state's office for each state of incorporation, we did not request or receive contractual
documents from most of the entrepreneurs participating in the research. Three
entrepreneurs, however, volunteered to provide all of their firm's contractual documents,
each of which included a voting agreement with language similar to the above.
1o6

108 See NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATIoN, http://www.nvca.org/ (follow

"Resources: Model Legal Documents" hyperlink) (last updated Feb. 2010).
109Id.
"0 Id. (follow "Term Sheet" hyperlink).

1' Id. (follow "Voting Agreement" hyperlink).
112

See JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND

ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS

33

(1997)

(describing the use of a neutral or

independent director as a compromise between the entrepreneur and the VCs, and noting

that the independent director can even be appointed by a designated third party if the
entrepreneur and VC cannot agree on an individual).
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preferred stock to elect any remaining directors by voting on an as-converted
basis." 3 As pointed out by Smith, this is not the same as mutual appointment, since
at any given time, either the entrepreneurs or the VCs will hold a majority of
equity on an as-converted basis.114 He concludes, based on an examination of
charter provisions from over 300 VC-backed firms, that independent directors are
typically appointed either by the entrepreneurs or the VCs, depending on who
holds more equity at the time." 5 Smith argues that "a company would not want
both this charter provision and the foregoing voting agreement because the two
provisions conflict.""6

The fact that the provisions differ, however, does not necessarily imply that a
company would not desire both. It is important to recognize that the voting rights
agreement has the higher vote threshold-either unanimous approval or a majority
of each class of stock voting separately-and consequently, compliance with it
implies compliance with the charter. Any director elected by unanimous agreement
or by a.majority of each class voting separately will also satisfy the typical charter
requirement, since she will have the support of a majority of all outstanding equity
voting together. .
Putting a more stringent threshold in the voting agreement makes practical
sense. This practice gives the parties flexibility to amend the bylaws or the voting
agreement at a later date (e.g. to add or remove additional directors) without
having to file an amended charter with the state. Under standard contractual
interpretation, the more specific language contained in the voting agreement will
govern over the general language contained in a typical corporate charter. Smith
admits that voting agreements, which are not generally included in his sample,
could modify his interpretation.' 1 7 Voting agreements with this type of language,
appear to be the norm, and consequently formal appointment rights often (though
not necessarily always) require a mutually appointed independent director.
This interpretation is supported by qualitative evidence from the interviews I
conducted. Among all the interviews, I did not find a single observation in which
the selection of an independent director was decided by a contested vote count. I
asked each subject how the independent directors at his or her firm were selected.
No one claimed that the VCs (or the entrepreneurs) were entitled to select the
independent director on account of how many shares that party held on an asconverted basis. Rather, the parties consulted each other and made sure everyone
approved the director selected. In fact, in many cases, the identity of the
independent director was specifically negotiated as part of the financing, and the
name(s) of the independent director(s) were sometimes included directly in the
voting agreement. This point further emphasizes that independent director
selection is bargained over.

"
4

11

See Smith, supra note 30, at 324-28.
See id. at 330-37.

" See id.
116 See id. at 335.
"' See id. at 334-36.
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As mentioned previously, however, this raises a separate concern. Regardless
of the contractual nomination rights, one party may have more bargaining power or
influence over independent director selection." 8 Consequently, some independent
directors may not truly be independent. The VCs, for example, have extensive
professional networks and influence in the relevant industry. They may be able to
use these sources of power to ensure that the selected director favors the VCs. The
data described above records the formal classification of board seats, and may
understate the true extent of VC control. To address this issue, I also record board
classification on a de facto basis. The de facto coding looks beyond the formal
appointment rights and considers which party actually nominated the director and
whether either party had a prior relationship with the director. I reclassify an
independent director as a VC if the director was nominated exclusively by the
VCs, and as an entrepreneur if the director was nominated exclusively by the
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, if both parties played a significant role in the
selection of the director or both had a prior relationship with the individual, I
continue to classify the director as independent.
As expected, the percentage of independent directors decreases under the de
facto coding. On a de facto basis both the VCs and the Entrepreneurs gain board
seats. Also, several firms that were classified as Arbitration under the formal
coding are reclassified as VC-control or E-control under the de facto coding. This
is represented in table 5.
Table 5: Formal and De Facto Appointments
All Rounds (n=154)
Formal De Facto A Mean
Mean
0
5.5
Board Seats 5.5
% VC Seats 43.9
+2.7
46.6
+1.6
34.6
% E Seats
33.0
-4.3
18.8
% ID Seats
23.1

FirstRound (n=54)
Formal De Facto
4.6
4.6
39.4
36.4
39.5
38.6
21.1
25.0

A Mean
0
+3.0
+0.9
-3.9

% Firms
VC-Control
E-Control
Arbitration
Deadlock

9.3
14.8
70.3
5.6

+7.4
+3.7
-11.1
0

118

24.7
7.1
64.3
3.9

33.1
9.8
50.6
6.5

+8.4
+2.7
-13.7
+2.6

16.7
18.5
59.2
5.6

The mere fact that both parties agree on an independent director does not

automatically ensure that the director is independent. To illustrate, the entrepreneur may
agree to the appointment of an outside director whose interests are closely aligned with the
VC's (i.e., perhaps the director is a close friend of the VC). The entrepreneur may agree to
this director in order to obtain other terms beneficial to the entrepreneur. The de facto

coding described in table 5 addresses this concern.
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If VCs dominate the actual appointment of independent directors, IDarbitration may be a largely symbolic structure' 19 that does not operate any
differently than pure VC- control. On the one hand, the data suggests that VCs
have slightly more influence than entrepreneurs over the selection of independent
directors. Under de facto control, the percent of board seats held by VCs increases
by 2.7% compared to a 1.6% increase for entrepreneurs and the percentage of
boards under VC-control increases by 8.4%, compared.to a 2.7% increase for Econtrol.
These data show that independent directors are not always perfectly impartial,
and this bias tends to favor the VCs. On the other hand, the vast majority of the
formally coded independent directors remain independent under the de facto
coding. And ID-arbitration remains the most common board configuration,
representing over half the observations, even under the de facto coding.
2. Relational Ties to the Independent Director

It is impossible to directly measure the effect of reputation on independent
director selection. Two facts, however, suggest that independent directors face a
significant reputational constraint. First, the independent directors in my sample
are typically from the same community as the entrepreneur and VC investor. Over
two-thirds of the independent directors in my sample population were located in
Silicon Valley (broadly defined to include the entire San Francisco Bay Area), the
same general area as the sample firms. Second, entrepreneurs and VCs typically
have some prior relationship to the firm's independent directors. Both of the
primary parties knew the independent director(s) in over 70% of the sample
120
observations.
These geographic and network ties constrain the independent director's
discretion. Since all the parties are typically located in the same area it is easier for
reputations to form. The preexisting relationship between the independent director
and a firm's entrepreneurs and VCs gives the independent director additional
incentive to use her discretion in a reasonable manner, assuming she plans to
continue working with both parties in the future.
Also, an independent director with strong ties to both of the primary parties
may be less susceptible to side payments (i.e. bribes). Side payments are an
obvious concern in any three-party distributional game. For example, the VC may
offer various explicit or implicit rewards to the independent director if she is
willing to support the VC's position. Such payments could undermine the benefits
of arbitration, since the independent director may simply sell her discretion to the

119 See generally Mark C. Suchman, The Contractas Social Artifact, 37 L. & Soc'Y

REv. 91 (2003) (describing the symbolic use of contract).
120 This is coded for each round of financing, and it may double count directors who
appear in multiple rounds.
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highest bidder.121 Bribes of this sort are legally prohibited as a violation of the
director's fiduciary duty of loyalty.12 2 Perhaps more important, this type of
collusion is also limited by reputational considerations. An independent director
who tends to favor one side over the other may develop a bad reputation in the
disfavored community. Given the mutual appointment rights described above, such
an independent director may be blocked from future board appointments by the
disfavored group. The independent director could lose whatever benefits she
expects to gain by serving as a director for future firms. This check only works to
the extent that the primary parties are able to observe the independent director's
conduct, and communicate this to other parties. Such communications are
presumably more effective when the independent director is from the same
community as the entrepreneur and VC and they have a preexisting relationship.
If the independent director has an ongoing relationship with both of the
primary parties, the reputational constraint can be effective even if the individual
does not plan to serve as a director for future firms. If either of the primary parties
is upset with the independent director's decision, then that party can directly
sanction her for harming the relationship. In this respect, a truly "independent"
director-one that neither party knew beforehand-or a director from outside the
community, may be less valuable because it would be harder to constrain her
through reputational ties. Ideally, the primary parties want an impartial or neutral
director, but not a disconnected or outside party.12 3 The data support this
reputational account.
See Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in
Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986) (explaining the risk of collusion in
121

contracts with more than two parties).
A director is required to act in the best interest of the firm and its shareholders. If a
director were to receive a side payment to influence his vote on a matter, it would
constitute a clear conflict between the director's personal interests and the welfare of the
firm, and it is unlikely that such a side payment would be deemed fair to the corporation.
See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001) (stating that transactions that benefit
122

directors or officers are not void or voidable if (1) the material facts of the conflict are
known by the board and authorized by a majority of disinterested directors, (2) the material
facts of the conflict are known to shareholders and approved by the shareholders, or (3) the
transaction is proven to be entirely fair to the corporation); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2,
6-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) ("Such personal transactions of directors with their
corporations, such transactions as may tend to produce a conflict between self-interest and
fiduciary obligation, are, when challenged, examined with the most scrupulous care, and if
there is any evidence of improvidence or oppression, any indication of unfairness or undue
advantage, the transactions will be voided.").
123 Interestingly, strong reputational ties to the independent director can help constrain
the behavior of the primary parties, even if the independent director does not hold a tiebreaking seat on the board. As described above, the relational tie between the primary
parties may be insufficient to support an effective reputational sanction, and it may be
difficult to communicate the underlying conduct to third parties. Having an independent
director sitting on the board effectively creates a third-party observer, who is in an ideal
position to observe misconduct. Furthermore, if the independent director has an ongoing
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These reputational results may be more pronounced in Silicon Valley. In
Silicon Valley it may be easier to find an independent director with an ongoing
relationship with both of the primary parties. Silicon Valley has a high
concentration of entrepreneurial activity and reputational ties are particularly
important.124 To the extent that reputational bonds are less effective in other
locations, it may be harder to prevent collusion and harder to align the independent
director's interests. The data from Kaplan and Stramberg (displayed in table 4),
however, illustrate that independent directors are used with similar frequency
outside Silicon Valley.
3. Industry Experience

In the follow-up surveys, I asked each entrepreneur about the
background/prior experience of the independent directors sitting on Startup's
board. Entrepreneurs were asked to rate, on a scale of one to five, each
independent director's (1) prior experience in the relevant industry, and (2) prior
experience with venture capital. The results are summarized in table 6. Significant
industry experience is an important criterion in selecting an independent director,
seemingly more important than having prior experience in venture capital.
Table 6: Independent Director Experience
No Prior
Experience

Industry Experience (n=30)
VC Experience (n=29)

(1)
0.0%
6.9%

(2)
6.7%
34.5%

(3)
13.3%
24.1%

(4)
23.3%
20.7%

Very
Experienced

Average
Rating

(5)
56.7%
13.8%

4.3
3.0

Industry experience is important for effective arbitration. Independent
directors need sufficient experience in the relevant industry to identify the desired
outcome. An inexperienced director is more likely to make errors, even if she is
unbiased and has desirable incentives. The independent director needs to
understand the consequences of different actions and predict the effect on the
relationship with both parties and is from the same community she may be able to sanction
such instances of misconduct.
This paper focuses on arbitration-by-voting. Voting has the advantage that it creates a
formal prohibition on the undesired conduct, since it would fail to achieve board
authorization. By contrast, arbitration-by-reputation relies on the strength of relational ties
to create an effective sanction and can apply to firm actions that do not require explicit
board authorization. In this account, the independent director can help broker a trusting
relationship between the two primary parties, similar to Uzzi's account of a third-party
intermediary who could connect two unembedded parties. See Brian Uzzi, Social Structure
and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The ParadoxofEmbeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
35, 47-48 (1997). The ability of an independent director to help embed the relationship
between the entrepreneur and the VC is similar to Suchman and Cahill's account of law
firms in Silicon Valley. See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 99, at 683.
124 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 99, at 697-703.
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entrepreneur and VC investor. The primary parties address this concern by
appointing independent directors with significant experience in the relevant
industry.
In sum, independent directors are typically selected by the mutual agreement
of the entrepreneur and VC, have ongoing relational ties to both parties, and have
significant experience in the relevant industry. Collectively, this paints a picture
consistent with my theory of ID-arbitration.
VI. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
This Part considers alternative theories of the independent director. Other
theories suggest that independent directors are necessary because they can serve as
monitors, advisors, or mediators. Because these theories typically draw their
assumptions from the experiences of publicly held firms, however, they are not
sufficient to explain the presence of independent directors in privately held VCbacked firms. In particular, none of the existing theories explain the independent
director's voting rights.
A. MonitoringRole

Independent directors are expected to monitor management on behalf of a
firm's stockholders (the "monitoring" role). This explanation dominates most of
the legal,12 5 the economic,12 6 and the business literature. 127 The independent
director's role as monitor includes selecting the firm's CEO, providing incentives
to management, and representing the interests of the stockholders in strategic
decisions.
The monitoring role is based on a separation between ownership and control
in publicly held firms, first recognized by Berle and Means.12 8 In a publicly held
firm, stockholders are diffuse and lack incentives to directly monitor
management. 129 As a consequence, the owners are extremely weak compared to

125 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 104 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the

Outside Director: An Agenda for InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 872-76
(1991); Oliver Williamson, CorporateGovernance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1219 (1984).
126 See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 4, at 103, 107-08; Hermalin & Weisbach,

supra note 11, at 96-99.
127 See Jay W. Lorsch, Empowering the Board, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 25, 31-38 (2000).
128 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1-9 (1933); see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H.

Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
129 This level of shareholder dispersion is limited to large publicly traded firms in the
United States and the United Kingdom. Outside of these countries, even publicly traded

2010]1

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN STARTUP FIRMS

499

management. In this setting, independent directors are supposed to mitigate the
agency problem by acting as representatives of the common equity holders.
By contrast, in private startup firms, investors are not separated from control
(or at least much less so). Investments in a startup firm are concentrated among a
relatively small number of parties and such investors often demand board seats and
other governance rights in connection with their investment. 13 0 VCs can sometimes
use this power to replace the CEO and other key executives.13 Since the investors
in startup firms monitor management directly, under the dominant theory there is
no need for independent directors. The monitoring function, performed by
independent directors in publicly held firms, is performed directly by the VCs in
startup firms.
Even the definition of an independent director is different in these two
settings. 13 2 An independent director in a publicly traded firm needs to be
independent of management, but not necessarily independent of the firm's
shareholders. It may even be desirable to compensate a public company
independent director with large amounts of common stock, as this may further
align her interests with the group she is supposed to represent.133 By contrast, in a
VC-backed startup, an independent director should not be directly affiliated with
either the entrepreneurs or the VCs. Independent directors for a startup firm are
typically selected by the mutual agreement of the firm's entrepreneurs and VCs.
This distinction further emphasizes that the same theory cannot apply to

firms have relatively concentrated ownership. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A
Survey of CorporateGovernance,52 J. FIN. 737, 754-55 (1997).
130 See Sahlman, supra note 17,
at 506.
131 See Michael T. Hannan, M. Diane Burton & James N. Baron, Inertia
and Change
in the Early Years: Employment Relations in Young, High Technology Firms, 5 INDUS. &

CORP. CHANGE 503, 526 (1996) (showing that approximately 40% of founder CEOs of
VC-backed firms are replaced within 40 months of formation); Thomas F. Hellmann &
Manju Puri, Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical

Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 169, 182 (2002) (showing. that firms financed by venture capital are
twice as likely to replace the CEO as non-VC-backed firms).
132 There are several distinct conceptualizations and legal standards for the
"independent" or "outside" director. For example, the SOX legal standard is based on the
individual's status with respect to the firm and its senior management, while Delaware's
"disinterested" director standard is based on the particular transaction event. See Usha
Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 450-51 (2008)

(contrasting status-based conceptions of director independence with Delaware's notion of a
disinterested director). Under Delaware law, an individual may count as "disinterested" for
one transaction but not another. See id Also, the individual's ties to non-management
constituencies may be relevant for some conceptualizations of "independence" but not
others. See id; see generally Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent

Director,32 DIL. J. CORP. L. 73 (2007).
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465, 1487
"

(2007).
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independent directors in both settings. The monitoring role cannot explain the use
of independent directors in private startup firms.
B. Advisory Role

In addition to monitoring, directors are sometimes said to provide strategic
advice to management (the "advisory" role).13 4 This explanation receives less
attention in the economic literature; however, it may be fairly important in startup
firms, given that the top executives in startup firms generally have less experience
than their counterparts in publicly held firms. To the extent that the business
literature provides an explanation for independent directors in private firms, it
generally emphasizes the advisory role.' 35
The advisory role cannot explain the independent director's voting rights.
Providing advice is not unique to the position of director. If a firm wants advice
from a particular individual it could hire her as a consultant or employee rather
than appointing her to the board; or the firm could even create a separate advisory
board without voting rights, a practice sometimes used in startup firms. What the
advisory role cannot explain is why the individual needs to be given a stake in the
firm's governance arrangements. Why does she need to have voting rights, and
more particularly, why are independent directors typically given the tie-breaking
vote on the firm's board? If the advisory role were the only explanation for the use
of independent directors we would not expect independent directors to hold the tiebreaking vote so frequently. My point is not to argue against the advisory role or
other non-governance explanations,'3 6 but rather to emphasize the need for an
alternative governance-based theory.
See MYLEs L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 13-22 (1971).
See, e.g., Bart Clarysse, Mirjam Knockaert & Andy Lockett, Outside Board
Members in High Tech Start-ups, 29 SMALL Bus. ECON. 243, 244-45 (2007) (discussing
134
135

ways an outside director can add value to a startup firm); Roger H. Ford, Outside Directors
and the Privately-OwnedFirm: Are They Necessary?, 13 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND
PRAc. 49, 51-54 (1988) (comparing private firms with and without outside directors); see
generally Vance H. Fried, Garry D. Bruton, & Robert D. Hisrich, Strategy and the Board
of Directors in Venture Capital-BackedFinns, 13 J. Bus. VENTURING 493 (1998) (noting
that boards of privately held startup firms are more involved in strategy-making).
136 Closely related to the advisory role, independent directors can also bring status to
the firm and serve as a link to external resources. See Clarysse, Knockaert & Lockett, supra
note 135, at 244-45. If prominent individuals serve as independent directors of a firm, they
may signal to other market participants that the firm is a high quality business, helping the
firm attract key employees, new investments, and so forth; see generally David H. Hsu,
What Do EntrepreneursPayfor Venture CapitalAffiliation?, 59 J. Fin. 1805 (2004); Toby
E. Stuart, Ha Hoang & Ralph C. Hybels, InterorganizationalEndorsements and the
Performance ofEntrepreneurialVentures, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 315 (1999). This status-based

explanation, however, is not unique to the position of director. If a firm wants an individual
to serve as a link to external resources, it does not need to appoint her to the board or give
her voting rights. This explanation, similar to the advisory role, does not address the
director's voting rights. While non-governance explanations like this may help explain the
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C. Directorsas Mediators

Blair and Stout propose an alternative theory of board-level mediation. They
argue that the board of directors for a publicly held firm functions as a "mediating
hierarchy," balancing the interests of different corporate constituencies (i.e.
employees, creditors, shareholders, etc.). 37 The board essentially mediates
disputes among competing interests within the firm. However, under the mediating
hierarchy, the firm's competing interests are not represented directly on the board.
Directors do not serve any particular constituency, but rather the interest of the
firm as a whole. The "mediating hierarchy" explains why the board as a wh6le
should have decision-making authority, but it cannot explain why independent
directors often hold a tie-breaking board seat in startup firms.
The mediating hierarchy theory is not intended to explain governance
practices in startup firms. Blair and Stout's theory of board mediation is expressly.
limited to publicly held firms:
[D]irectors of public corporations with widely dispersed share ownership
are remarkably free from the direct control of any of the groups that
make up the corporate "team," including shareholders, executives, and
employees. . . . In contrast, in a closely held firm, stock ownership is

usually concentrated in the hands of a small number of investors who not
only select and exercise tight control over the board, but also are
themselves involved in managing the firm as officers and directors.138
While this may be an accurate characterization for many small businesses, it hides
potential conflicts that can occur within closely held firms when the owner and
manager are not the same party or when there is heterogeneity among the group of
owners (both of which occur in venture capital). In these cases the various
corporate constituencies may wish to share control with a third-party independent
director. Blair and Stout do not address private contractual devices that can be used
to select a director who is independent of the firm's other constituents.13 9 My

benefits that independent directors provide to a firm, they cannot explain the director's role
in governance and, as a result, are outside the focus of this paper.
137
38

1

See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 8.
See id. at 281.

Blair and Stout argue that the parties within a firm may decide to go public in
order to have an independent board mediate their conflicts. See id. at 281-82. In this sense,
the mediating hierarchy can be seen as part of the corporate contract (a necessary part for
public held firms). My analysis shows that firms do not need to go public to take advantage
of independent director arbitration. In fact, independent directors in a publicly traded firm
may be less independent than their counterparts in private startups, due to the enormous
influence that public company . CEOs have over board composition and director
nomination. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 87, at 23-44, 61-79.
139
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analysis, while similar to Blair and Stout in some respects, shows that firms do not
need to go public to find an independent director as arbitrator.
While the mediating hierarchy theory does not address privately held firms, it
can help explain the balancing of competing interests that a startup's independent
directors must consider. In this respect, my theory of ID-arbitration is a partial
extension of Blair and Stout's theory to VC-backed firms. The resulting analysis
when applied to startup firms must account for the board representation of
entrepreneurs and VCs. My theory accounts for these non-independent directors by
modeling the ex ante financing contract, in which the entrepreneur and VC
compete for board representation.
VII. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS:

140

CORPORATE LAW

Fiduciary obligations under corporate law could, at least in theory, function as
an alternative solution to the problem of intra-firm opportunism. Preventing such
abuses is one of the conceptual justifications for imposing fiduciary obligations on
the board.141 In the analysis above, I assumed that none of the three strategies
would constitute a breach of the board's fiduciary duties, and consequently,
directors would vote their self-interest even if this harms other parties. It is a
positive legal question, however, whether such behavior is actually consistent with
the director's fiduciary obligations.
Fiduciary obligations require the director to serve the best interests of the
corporation, potentially reducing the scope for opportunistic behavior.14 2 To
illustrate, a board under VC-control may wish to sell the firm immediately to
benefit preferred stock. Yet, this action may be deemed a violation of the board's
fiduciary obligations, since it may reduce the expected value realized by common
stockholders. Similarly, entrepreneurs in control may be prohibited from taking
certain actions that harm preferred stockholders. In the extreme, all ex post
inefficient outcomes could, be deemed a violation of the board's fiduciary
obligations. Under this (unrealistic) characterization, fiduciary obligations would
accomplish what contract could not-effectively prohibiting opportunistic conduct

In addition to legal obligations, some writers argue that reputational considerations
may help constrain opportunistic conduct in VC-backed firms: even though the party with
control of the board has the ability to act opportunistically, it may refrain from doing so if
there is a sufficient reputational sanction attached to such conduct. See generally D.
140

Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL &

EMERGING Bus. L. 133 (1998); Vladimir A. Atanasov, Vladimir I. Ivanov, & Kate Litvak,
The Effect of Litigation on Venture Capitalist Reputation (EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings
Paper, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/ abstract- 1343981 (arguing that shareholder
litigation can damage a VC's reputation even if the VC ultimately wins the lawsuit).
141 For an economist's rationale for fiduciary obligation, see Oliver Hart, An
Economist's View ofFiduciaryDuty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299 (1993).
142 See
id.
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that cannot be specified ex ante.143 This Part considers two questions: (1) does
corporate law actually behave in this way; and (2) given limited information, do
we even want judges to attempt this role?
A. Positive Analysis: FiduciaryConflicts Between Preferredand Common

In practice, there are several reasons why fiduciary obligations are not an
effective constraint on opportunistic conduct between entrepreneurs and VCs.'"
First, most of the disputes that may arise between entrepreneurs and VCs are
protected from judicial review by the business judgment rule, a presumption in
favor of a corporation's board of directors.14 5 The business judgment rule
effectively prevents courts from reviewing business decisions unless the board
engaged in self-dealing.146 While technically there is a "conflict" between
preferred and common, this is unlikely to be treated as self-dealing by a court,
since the controlling party is merely acting in the interests of its equity position in
the startup firm. Most of-the conflicts described in this paper-such as the decision
of how much to invest in research and development-would presumably be
protected by the business judgment rule. While it is possible for a plaintiff to
overcome the business judgment rule, the standard of review makes it extremely
difficult for plaintiffs to succeed.147
Second, assuming plaintiffs can overcome (or avoid) the business judgment
rule, it is unclear whether the board even owes a fiduciary obligation to noncontrolling classes of equity. Fiduciary obligations generally require directors to
serve the best interests of the corporation. This requirement is often interpreted to
mean that directors should attempt to maximize shareholder value, equating the
"interests of the corporation" with the interests of its equity claimants.148 In VC-

143 Fiduciary law is often premised on the inability of the parties to bargain at arms'
length. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 125, at 90; Victor Brudney,

Contract and FiduciaryDuty in CorporateLaw, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595 (1997).
'" But see generally Atanasov, Ivanov & Litvak, supra note 140 (documenting

litigation involving VCs). While entrepreneurs rarely win fiduciary suits against VC
directors, the authors suggest these lawsuits provide some disciplinary effect on VCs. Id. at
33. In particular, they find that VCs involved in litigation suffer a reputational penalty in
future years of operation. See id.
145 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
146 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REv. 83, 90 (2004).

147 If the business judgment rule applies, the plaintiff would need to show that there
was no rational basis for the board's decision. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d
776, 780-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (suggesting that almost any plausible benefit to
shareholders, even with little evidence supporting the claim, is sufficient to justify a
board's action).
148 For arguments explaining why corporate fiduciary protections are not extended to
other stakeholders, see generally Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various

Rationalesfor Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary
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backed firms, where there are multiple classes of equity, however, it is unclear
what this obligation entails.14 9 Do fiduciary obligations require the board to
maximize the aggregate value of all classes of equity, or can the board favor the
interests of one class of shareholders over another?
The conflict between the entrepreneur and the VC described above is
essentially a conflict between common stock and preferred stock. There are two
basic scenarios where this conflict arises in VC-backed firms: (1) a board
controlled by common stockholders takes actions which allegedly harm preferred
stockholders, and (2) a board controlled by preferred stockholders takes actions
which allegedly harm common stockholders. In both settings, Delaware law
generally allows the controlling party to cause the firm to take actions which
benefit it at the expense of non-controlling classes of equity.o50 Fried and Ganor
refer to this as a "control-contingent approach to fiduciary duties."' 5 1 Their
interpretation is illustrated by two Delaware decisions authored by Chancellor
Allen.
The first case-Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adamsl 5 2-involved a firm,
Genta Corporation, managed by a common-controlled board. Genta faced a choice
between liquidating and continuing to operate as an independent entity.153
Liquidation would yield a payoff less than the preferred shareholders' liquidation
preferences, meaning common stockholders would receive nothing.154 Remaining
independent offered common shareholders the possibility of upside gain, but it
would put the preferred shareholders' investment at greater risk.' The board,
seeking to benefit common shareholders, obtained debt financing to enable Genta
to continue operating.156 The preferred sought to block the deal in court. 157 The
court rejected the preferred shareholders' claim:
While the facts out of which this dispute arises indisputably entail the
imposition by the board of (or continuation of) economic risks upon the
STETSON L. REv. 23 (1992); William J. Camey, Does Defining Constituencies
Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
149 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 148, at 33 (noting that a dual-class capital structure

Duties, 21

preferred and common stock complicates fiduciary analysis).
involving
50
oSee Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 990.
152

15
5

705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997).
See id at 1041.
See id

id
" The preferred stockholders argued that the deal constituted a sale of control, and
was therefore subject to Revlon duties, which require the board to put the company up for
auction. Id at 1042. The court noted that had the company been put up for auction, the
preferred shareholders' underwater liquidation preferences would have allowed them to
156

outbid any competitors, seize control, liquidate the company, and wipe out the common. Id
at 1057.
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preferred stock... and while this board action was taken for the benefit
largely of the common stock, those facts do not constitute a breach of
duty. . . . The special protections offered to the preferred are contractual
in nature. . . . [G]enerally it will be the duty of the board, where

discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of
common stock-as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to
be-to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of
preferred stock, where there is a conflict.158
Equity-Linked is consistent with other Delaware cases allowing boards to favor the
interests of common stockholders over preferred stock, as long as they respect the
contractual protections bargained for by the preferred shareholders.' 9 VCs holding
preferred stock cannot expect fiduciary protection if they lose control of the board.
Interestingly, common stockholders do not receive much more judicial
protection when the tables are turned. The second case-Orbanv. Field-involved
Office Mart, a firm managed by a preferred-controlled board.160 Office Mart's
board arranged for the sale of the firm to Staples for a price less than the VC's
preferred stock liquidation preferences, and consequently, provided no payout to
common stock.'6 1 Common stockholders sued Office Mart's board for breach of
the duty of loyalty owed to common stockholders.162 The court recognized that this
transaction potentially harmed common stockholders, but nonetheless ruled for the
preferred-controlled board.163 The court found no breach of duty, noting that "the
common stockholders had no legal right to a portion of the merger consideration
under Delaware law or the corporate charter."'" The court also noted, however,
that the plaintiff failed to claim that the merger was not in the "best interests of the
corporation,"l65 implicitly suggesting that a common shareholder might be able to
prevail by showing that the board's action was not in the firm's best interest. 6 6
Due to the relative infrequency of litigation involving firms under preferred-

15 Id. at 1042.

159 See D. Gordon Smith, The CriticalResource Theory of FiduciaryDuty, 55 VAND.

L. REv. 1399, 1471 (2002) (noting that the preferred stock relationship is not fiduciary in
nature); see also Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986)
("[W]ith respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred
stock from common, the duty of the corporation and its directors is essentially contractual
and the scope of the duty is appropriately defined- by reference to the specific words
evidencing that contract . .. "
160 No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr.
1, 1997).
See id.
See id. at
163 See id. at
164 See id. at
165 See id. at
161

162

*2-3.
*4.
*32.
*26 n.23.
166 Fried & Ganor, supra note 14,
at 992.
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control,167 the law is not fully settled in this area. Nonetheless, Orban shows that
a preferred-controlled board does "not owe a fiduciary duty specifically to the
common shareholders and that it has wide discretion to benefit the preferred
shareholders instead."l 6 9 The court's "control-contingent" approach to fiduciary
duties, illustrated by Equity Linked and Orban, makes it difficult for an injured
party, lacking board control, to claim fiduciary protection.
Third, fiduciary claims may need to be brought as derivative lawsuits as
opposed to direct lawsuits.170 Under derivative litigation any judgment would go to
the entire firm.'7 ' This can be a significant problem for entrepreneurs suing VCs,
since the entire judgment may go to the preferred shareholders when the firm is
worth less than the liquidation preferences. Even though the entrepreneur may
have been harmed by losing the option value of her common stock, the derivative
form of fiduciary litigation will not recognize this damage.
B. Normative Analysis: Judges as Arbitrators

Though corporate law in Delaware and other United States' jurisdictions does
not constrain opportunistic conduct, it is a separate issue whether we think it
should or even can perform this role effectively. Recognizing the risk of
opportunistic conduct, some writers argue for stronger legal protections. 7 2 Fried
and Ganor, for example, propose that the contracting parties be able to opt into a
heightened fiduciary obligation:
[D]irectors would violate their fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders if they take steps that favor one (or more) classes of shares
over one or more other classes of shares, and the cost they impose on the

Preferred-control is unusual outside of venture capital. See id. And litigation
involving such firms is very rare. See Atanasov, Ivanov & Litvak, supra note 140, at 3 n.2.
168 For an alternative interpretation, see generally Dilillo v. Ustman Tech. Inc.,
No.
B148198, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1527 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2001) (finding that
minority shareholder plaintiffs had properly stated an individual, direct claim for relief
where an asset purchase was allegedly negotiated and agreed upon without adequate
procedural protections for minority shareholders).
169 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at
992.
170 See generally Kennedy v. Venrock Assoc., 348 F.3d 584 (7th Cir.
2003)
for
plaintiffs).
creates
litigation
derivative
problem
the
(illustrating
167

Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action andDerivativeLitigation:Economic Analysis andRecommendationsfor Reform, 58
171

U. CHI. L.

REV. 1, 10- 11 (199 1).
Bratton also recognizes the problem with the current state of legal protections
offered in startup firms, noting the vulnerability of preferred stockholders. See Bratton,
supra note 14, at 894. His proposed remedy is stronger enforcement of the contractual duty
to act in good faith and does not involve any change in fiduciary standards. See id. at 895.
Such contractual standards, however, could reduce some forms of opportunism.
172
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adversely affected class(es) exceeds the benefit to the favored
class(es).17 3
This standard basically asks the directors to maximize the aggregate value of all
classes of equity. If judges are able to adjudicate this standard, it would certainly
reduce opportunistic conduct, since the controlling party would be required to
pursue the ex post efficient outcome.
One limitation of this remedy is the informational demands that it places on
judges. The types of disputes likely to be heard under a heightened fiduciary
obligation include several business decisions: which investment to pursue, whether
to sell the firm, or whether to receive a new round of financing. Courts are not well
suited to adjudicate such matters.174 Unlike the hypothetical conflict described
above, the various alternatives available to a startup firm do not come with
assigned probabilities and payoffs. Rather, there are likely to be legitimate
disagreements about the best course of action. Determining the best strategy
requires experience with startup firms and familiarity with the relevant industry;
none of which are traits piossessed by most judges.
By contrast, independent directors are well suited for this role. Unlike judges,
independent directors typically have significant industry experience and familiarity
with the relevant business issues.17 5 When disagreements between the entrepreneur
and the VC arise, the independent director as tiebreaker is likely to be playing a
role very similar to the balancing approach advocated by Fried and Ganor. This
essentially becomes a question of whether judges or independent directors are
more qualified to adjudicate such disputes. Due to their business experience,
independent directors have certain advantages over judges in adjudicating disputes
between entrepreneurs and VCs.
A second limitation of a more robust fiduciary obligation is it may frustrate
the parties' ex ante interests. The threat of judicially imposed fiduciary obligations
may violate the VC's or the entrepreneur's ex ante participation constraint. In
some instances this could prevent investment from occurring ex ante. The VC, for
example, may require board control to ensure a sufficient monetary return;
however, if the VC's decisions are subject to increased judicial scrutiny through
fiduciary obligations, the VC's monetary returns could be compromised. Ex post
efficiency does not necessarily ensure ex ante participation. This problem is even
worse if the court is likely to make adjudicative errors, potentially making it even
harder to ensure ex ante participation. Fried and Ganor avoid this problem, since

173

See Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 1023.

Other than weighing costs and benefits to several parties, which is a difficult task,
there is no clear legal standard to apply. In Lon Fuller's terminology, a heightened
fiduciary obligation creates a "polycentric problem," which is poorly suited for judicial
adjudication. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 394-404 (1978).
174

175

See supra Part V.
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their proposal only calls for heightened fiduciary obligations if the parties opt into
this arrangement.' 76
Finally, a stronger fiduciary obligation could undermine the benefits of IDarbitration by replacing the independent director's decision with the decision of a
state-appointed judge. An action reached under ID-arbitration could still be
challenged as a breach of fiduciary obligation. This is particularly troubling. The
court would not simply be reviewing controlling-party opportunism, but rather,
second-guessing the vote of the independent director. Corporate law in Delaware
and other states recognizes this concern. Conflict of interest transactions ratified by
a majority of independent directors are subject to less judicial scrutiny.'7 7
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I propose a new theory to explain the governance role of
independent directors in startup firms financed by venture capital. Independent
directors are frequently used in VC-backed firms, and typically occupy a tiebreaking seat on the board. This practice cannot be explained by the existing
theory of independent directors. The current corporate governance literature, which
relies on diffuse ownership and passive investment to explain the presence of
independent directors on public boards, cannot explain their presence on private
startup boards. Indeed, unlike public companies, private startup firms have
concentrated ownership structures, and their investors actively participate in
managing the company.
To develop an alternative theory, I model a financing contract between an
entrepreneur and a VC investor. The contract is inherently incomplete and cannot
fully align the interests of the entrepreneur and VC. As a result, the allocation of
board seats becomes particularly important. If either party controls the board, it can
use this position opportunistically, causing the firm to pursue actions that benefit it
at the expense of the firm's aggregate welfare. By contrast, sharing board control
with an unbiased independent director can prevent this form of opportunistic
behavior. The independent director effectively becomes an arbitrator, settling
disputes that arise between the primary parties. Arbitration by an independent
director replaces controlling party opportunism with arbitrator discretion, and is
beneficial to the extent that the parties can find an unbiased director.
Data from my study of fifty-four Silicon Valley firms are consistent with this
prediction and illustrate several mechanisms that the entrepreneur and VC use to
ensure the selection of an unbiased independent director. These practices not only

176 See

Fried & Ganor, supra note 14, at 1020-21.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2001); In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc.
S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693,
696 (Del. Ch. 1971); MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 8.61(b) (2003).
1n
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support my theory, they suggest that the parties do not need additional legal
protections against opportunistic conduct. Indeed, heightened fiduciary protections
against opportunism may interfere with ID-arbitration and frustrate the will of the
parties.
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APPENDIX: DISCRETE ACTION SPACE

I model the incentives for three types of independent directors-(1) VC-Bias,
(2) E-Bias, and (3) Unbiased--corresponding respectively to whether the
independent director is selected by the VC, by the entrepreneur, or by their mutual
agreement. The following table illustrates the independent director's preference
ordering for each type of director (the independent director's preferences
determine the outcome of the structured bargaining game).
Table Al: Independent Director Preference Ordering
Second Choice
Independent Director Bias First Choice
Low-risk
No-risk
VC-Bias
No-risk
Low-risk
Unbiased
Low-risk
High-risk
E-Bias

Third Choice
High-risk
High-risk
No-risk

I assume the entrepreneur and VC can observe the independent director's
type. Consequently, they can predict how the independent director will vote for
any pair of strategy proposals. Thus, they can calculate each party's expected
payoff for each strategy pair, and solve for Nash equilibrium.
The boxes in table A2 show the strategy endorsed by an unbiased independent
director. This game includes two sets of Nash equilibrium: (VC=Low-risk;
E=Low-risk) and (VC = No-risk, E = Low-risk). The VC is indifferent between
proposing the Low-risk and No-risk strategies because it knows that the
entrepreneur will propose the Low-risk strategy in either case. Neither party has an
incentive to change their proposal given the other party's action. In either case the
firm will pursue the Low-risk strategy. This result is the efficient outcome.
Table A2: Bargaining Game (Unbiased ID)

E proposal

No-Risk
Low-Risk
High-Risk

No-Risk
N (40, 120)
L (60, 110)
N (40, 120)

VC Proposal
Low-Risk
L (60, 110)
L (60, 110)
L (60, 110)

.

High-Risk
N (40, 120)
L (60, 110)
H (75, 75)

Under ID-arbitration, the entrepreneur and VC give up the right to unilaterally
select the course of action, and, in so doing, they effectively commit to an outcome
determined by the independent director's preferences. When the independent
director is unbiased, the parties converge directly upon the efficient result.
If the independent director is biased in favor of either the entrepreneur or the
VC, the benefits of ID-arbitration disappear. The independent director effectively
gives the favored party an additional board seat, collapsing ID-arbitration into
either VC-control (if the VC is the favored party), or E-control (if the entrepreneur
is the favored party).

